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ABSTRACT 
The BC treaty process employs a model of claims negotiation new in the Canadian 
experience. Contrary to long-standing federal claims policy, treaties are being settled in 
areas where multiple indigenous groups lay claim to the same territory. Drawing on theories 
of human territoriality, critical legal geography, and indigenous geography, this thesis 
examines the indigenous socio-spatial identities at work within (and beyond) the BC treaty 
process, the spatial dimensions of aboriginal rights as articulated by Canadian courts, and BC 
Supreme Court actions that have arisen because of overlapping claims. Two overarching 
goals of the BC treaty process are to achieve certainty of jurisdiction and to avoid aboriginal 
rights litigation. This thesis concludes that insufficient Crown and judicial engagement with 
the issue of overlapping claims undermines both of these goals. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
A primary goal of the BC treaty process is to achieve certainty of jurisdiction over 
land and resources (BCTC, 201 la; McKee, 2009; Penikett, 2006; Woolford, 2005). The 
recent settlement of three modern treaties in British Columbia, however, is being celebrated 
against a backdrop of criticism and judicial challenge that casts the BC treaty process in a 
cloud of uncertainty. This thesis is concerned with one contentious dimension of the BC 
treaty process, overlapping and contested indigenous claims to territory, a phenomenon that 
is increasingly recognized as a significant barrier to the ethical settlement of treaties in 
British Columbia (BCTC, 2010a, 2010b, 2009). 
Indigenous groups wishing to negotiate a treaty in British Columbia are required to 
make "statements of intent:" assertions of collective identity and "traditional territory." 
Overlapping claims arise where multiple indigenous groups assert claims to the same 
geographic area. In the context of the BC treaty process, overlapping and contested claims 
are evident where one or more indigenous group contends that modern treaties are conferring 
treaty rights in areas for which there may not be a legitimate or exclusive claim. 
Territory is commonly enacted as a device for clarifying something else (Delaney, 
2005; Sack, 1986). Unpacking what this "something else" is, who defines it and for what 
purpose, is fundamental to understanding the causes, implications, and possible strategies for 
working through the issue of contested claims within and beyond the BC treaty process. If 
territory is to be understood as a means to establish certainty by delineating areal spheres of 
rights and authority (Delaney, 2005; Sack, 1986), it follows that the meaning of territory 
needs to be defined and understood. Territory does not "work" unless there is acceptance, or 
at least tacit acceptance, of its legitimacy (Delaney, 2005). 
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Indigenous understandings of territory, however, are often anything but simple, 
especially when contrasted with dominant (Western) understandings of place (see for 
example Thorn, 2009,2005; Egan, 2008; Larsen, 2006; Overstall, 2005; Turner et al., 2005; 
Turner and Jones, 2000; Marsden, 2002, 2001; Brown, 2002; Marsden and Galois, 1995; 
Ingold, 1987). The phenomenon of overlapping claims is thus more than a "problem" 
looking for a "solution," more than a mechanical issue of "resolving" contested boundary 
locations, it is in fact symptomatic of broader contestations concerning the meaning of 
boundaries, the ontology of space (Bird-David, 1999; Ingold, 1987), and competing visions 
for the actualization, through treaty negotiation, of indigeneity. 
How social collectives are defined, how they designate who are "insiders" and 
"outsiders" and for what purpose, bears on how socio-spatial identities are expressed (Alfred, 
2009, Newman, 2006; 2005, 2000; Poata-Smith, 2004; Paasi, 2000,1999; Newman and Paasi, 
1998; Canada, 1996). Indigenous groups1 participating in the BC treaty process are variously 
organized as "nations," Indian Act-defined Bands, tribal councils, customary organizations, 
and other types of "umbrella" organizations (BCTC, 201 lb). By "receiving" expressions of 
territory associated with these identities, the BC treaty commission has facilitated the 
addition of a "new" layer of socio-spatial identity to the landscape of indigenous geographies 
of British Columbia, the meaning and bounds of which are contested along multiple axes of 
difference.2 
1 The terms we use to describe groups of indigenous peoples are important and contextual. In the context of the BC 
treaty process, the term "First Nation" has a specific meaning: "First Nation means an aboriginal governing body, 
however organized and established by aboriginal people within their traditional territoiy in British Columbia, which 
has been mandated by its constituents to enter into treaty negotiations on their behalf with Canada and British 
Columbia" (BC Treaty Commission Act, 1995). In this thesis I employ the term "indigenous groups" to refer to 
groups of indigenous peoples, however organized, which may or may not be participating in the BC treaty process. 
In the legal context, I use the term "aboriginal" to refer to peoples whose aboriginal rights are afforded protection by 
s.35(l) of the Canadian Constitution (Constitution Act, 1982). When referring to specific indigenous groups, I 
attempt to use the name used by the group itself. 
2 The BC treaty process is a voluntary process of political negotiations among First Nations, Canada and British 
Columbia. According to the BC treaty commission, the neutral facilitator of the BC treaty process, "the main goal of 
3 
It is a fundamental right of indigenous peoples to define their own identity (United 
Nations, 2007). The actualization of this right necessarily extends to issues of governance 
and jurisdiction, both with respect to indigenous-state relations and to relations between and 
among indigenous groups. Because the settlement of treaties involves the statutory 
formalization of indigenous socio-spatial identities, the Crown is implicated in the issue of 
overlapping and contested claims, by default or design.3 The issue is not a strictly 
indigenous polemic. 
The negotiation and settlement of treaties in contested areas opens a veritable 
Pandora's box of difficult questions: Does the Crown's practice of negotiating with multiple 
indigenous groups in areas of contested claims have the potential to privilege some 
indigenous groups to the detriment of others? Does the settlement and implementation of 
treaties in contested areas prejudice the constitutionally protected rights of indigenous groups 
that are not party to such treaties? And finally, are contested claims a barrier to the ethical 
settlement of treaties, and if so what can and should be the role of the Crown and the courts 
in effecting reconciliation of contested claims in the context of treaty negotiation in British 
Columbia? 
In the following chapters I argue that insufficient Crown and judicial engagement on 
the issue in effect denies Canada's obligation to treat with indigenous peoples in a manner 
that is equitable and just. I argue that the issue is indeed problematic in the context of treaty 
negotiation because the settlement of treaties in contested areas in effect privileges some 
the treaty process is to provide certainty of jurisdiction over land and resources" (BCTC, 201 la, p. 1). The authority 
of the BC Treaty Commission to "receive" statements of intent is discussed in chapter 4. 
3 Three treaties have been ratified under the auspices of the BC treaty process: the Tsawwassen First Nation Final 
Agreement (2006), the Maa-Nulth First Nations Final Agreement (2006), and the Yale First Nation Final Agreement 
(2010). The Lheidli T'enneh Final Agreement (2006) was reached but not concluded due to insufficient support from 
Lheidli T'enneh members (BCTC, 201 lb; BCTC, 2007). The Nisga'a Final Agreement (1999) was negotiated with 
Canada's Comprehensive Claims Process (i.e., was not subject to the policies of the BC treaty process). As discussed 
in chapter 4, all of these treaties have been challenge in court because of overlapping claims. 
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indigenous groups to the detriment of others, and in so doing prejudices the aboriginal rights 
of indigenous groups with overlapping claims. A laissez faire approach to the issue at best 
puts the BC treaty process on ethically (if not legally) ambiguous ground, and at worst 
undermines two of its primary goals: to achieve certainty of jurisdiction and to avoid 
aboriginal rights litigation. What is required, and what I explicate in the following chapters, 
is an understanding of the causes and implications of overlapping claims, to serve as a 
foundation for further enquiry into strategies for harmonizing contested claims within (and 
beyond) the BC treaty process.4 
Methodological considerations 
This project has its origins in my long-standing interest in the rights of communities 
to land and resources, and in particular my interest in questions related to how we can better 
understand and accommodate indigenous rights and ways of knowing land within regimes of 
resource allocation and management, including claims negotiation. Over the span of the past 
twenty years, I have worked as a researcher, resource analyst and cartographer for and with a 
number of indigenous organizations, including Indian Bands, a tribal council, a tripartite land 
use planning group, and a group of hereditary indigenous leaders located in British Columbia 
and in the Northwest Territories. Such experience prevents me from claiming objectivity in 
undertaking this project. This project is very much compelled by my desire to support what I 
believe is an important and just cause: the goal of indigenous people to actualize their rights 
to land and self-determination. 
This project may be said to fall within the broad category of "action research" in that 
4 While beyond the scope of this thesis, it is worth noting that negotiations between the Crown and indigenous groups 
concerning revenue sharing and land management are similarly challenged by the issue of overlapping claims, 
particularly where governments are required to the assess the relative strength of claims to determine which First 
Nations to consult, negotiate and accommodate (see for example Canada, 2010; British Columbia, 2010). 
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its objective is to effect policy change that furthers a political goal, that of ethical treaty 
settlement. I do not claim, however, that this project lies at the more transformative end of 
the action research spectrum, where research "empowers people who are normally just the 
subjects of research, to develop their capacity to do their own research and develop their own 
solutions" (Kirby and McKenna, 1989, p. 26). My goal here is more modest: to engage with 
the intellectual space between (Katz, 1994) indigenous and non-indigenous perspectives, to 
improve understanding, and to seek out ways to bridge epistemological divides. 
The "positioned" approach I employ is supported by the work of scholars who have 
paid close attention to links between research, politics, and the production of knowledge 
(Howitt and Stevens, 2005; Gregory, 2004; Madge et al., 1997; Katz, 1994; Nast, 1994). 
Such scholars suggest that there is rarely if ever one universal truth but rather multiple, 
continually contested "partial truths" (Clifford, 1986). In this view methodological 
orientations are profoundly shaped by the epistemological and personal position of the 
researcher, which influences the research questions that are asked, the choice of text and 
people to consult, the way information is interpreted and what is done with research results 
(Madge et al., 1997). Research is inherently political not only because the knowledge it 
produces has political implications but because the entire process of research is politically 
infused (Howitt and Stevens, 2005; Gregory, 2004; Tuhiwai Smith, 1999; Madge et al., 1997; 
Nast, 1994). 
Post-colonial research, for example, places emphasis on identifying and confronting 
asymmetrical configurations of power that construct forces of social oppression (Howitt and 
Stevens, 2005; Gregory, 2004). Post-colonial research aligns with feminist and other critical 
orientations in that it attempts to challenge "underlying assumptions that serve to conceal the 
power relations that exist within society and the ways in which dominant groups construct 
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concepts of "common sense" and "facts" to provide ad hoc justification for the maintenance 
of inequalities and the continued oppression of [indigenous] people" (Tuhiwai Smith, 1999, p. 
185-186). 
A goal of post-colonial research, then, is to acknowledge and give voice to the 
legitimacy of indigenous knowledge, ways of knowing and being (Howitt and Stevens, 2005). 
A post-colonial epistemology is "a way of structuring assumptions, values, concepts, 
orientations, and priorities in research" (Tuhiwai Smith, 1999, p. 183). According to 
Tuhiwai Smith (1999), however, such an approach alone is not sufficient. What is essential 
to post-colonial research is that it be conceived, designed and carried out in a way that 
respects cultural ground rules, which, in Tuhiwai Smith's (1999) view, can be best 
accomplished by researchers whose preferred epistemologies are aligned with those they 
research or, better yet, by indigenous researchers themselves. 
Tuhiwai Smith's (1999) point is an important one. Researchers play a decisive role in 
the production of knowledge about indigenous peoples and the ways they are represented to 
broader society. Tuhiwai Smith's call for formerly silenced indigenous voices to take a 
prominent place on the academic stage is one that needs to be respected and accommodated. 
It is equally important, however, that respect for indigenous voices does not preclude others 
from uncensored dialogue. The objective of such dialogue is to have "a conversation, which 
not only informs each 'speaker' about the other, but transforms the relationship between 
them and possibly, in addition, even modifies their self-understandings" (Cairns, 2000, p. 16). 
An exploration of post-colonial approaches to research is particularly useful in that it 
exposes both what this project is and what it is not. I do not claim, for example, that I adopt 
an approach consistent with that of post-colonial research, or that I employ an indigenous 
epistemological "lens" in the analysis that follows. The questions with which this project is 
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concerned were not articulated by an indigenous community. In fact, the approach I employ 
has embedded a number of suppositions that may be contested in some indigenous circles, 
such as the idea that the issue of overlapping claims is indeed problematic in the context of 
treaty negotiation and that the Crown and the Courts are implicated in the issue. The future-
focused approach I employ flows from these suppositions, and is derived largely from my 
view that in order for there to be widespread and just treaty settlement, it will be necessary 
for all parties to claims negotiation to find ways to actualize "workable" forms of indigenous 
territorial identity through claims negotiation. 
Such a future-focused approach leaves much of the tremendously important work of 
challenging dominant discourses of colonialism to others, in favour of focusing on the causes 
and implications of the contemporary territorial identities at work in the BC treaty process. 
This approach is very different from the approach of post-colonial scholarship where 
exploring the links between the colonial past and present are of paramount importance (Egan, 
2008; Howitt and Stevens, 2005; Gregory, 2004). This project might be considered broadly 
post-colonial in that I have sought to expose some of the dominant discourses related to how 
indigenous territorial identity is conceptualized by the courts of Canada and within 
contemporary claims negotiation. In this way the value of this research for indigenous 
people may lie not in my admittedly limited expertise in cross-cultural interpretation, but in 
the explication of how practices of the Crown and the courts might be understood and 
changed to further shared goals. 
Lastly, before turning to the specific method I employ and to the structure of this 
document, it should be noted that the social phenomena with which territoriality is so 
intimately tied are incredibly complex and varied in the context of indigenous territorial 
claims, and this has resulted in a study that is necessarily broad in scope. It is the conclusion 
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of this thesis that each instance of overlapping and contested claims requires intense inquiry 
to inform processes of territorial reconciliation. The purpose of this project is to lay some of 
the groundwork for such inquiry. 
Method 
An overarching objective of this project is to lay the groundwork for further inquiry 
involving focused interviews with key actors in the BC treaty process and with individuals 
and groups who have worked through similar issues in other jurisdictions, such as those 
engaged with New Zealand's Waitangi Tribunal and Maori Land Court and Australia's 
National Native Title Tribunal. With this in mind, early in the conceptualization of this study 
I decided that this project would be entirely literature-based, and involve the review and 
synthesis of both primary and secondary sources, both academic and "gray." 
To this end, I employed a phased approach to literature review, synthesis and critical 
analysis. Phase one involved a review and synthesis of scholarship related to methodological 
considerations and a number of key theoretical considerations. Phase 2 of the project 
necessarily overlapped with phase 1, and involved the iterative synthesis of sources related to 
claims negotiation and settlement, indigenous territorial identity, and aspects of Canadian 
common law related to the spatial dimensions of aboriginal rights. Phase 3 involved 
engaging with unpublished "gray" material, including the text and maps of the statements of 
intent of indigenous groups participating in the BC treaty process, and the legal challenges to 
modern treaties brought because of overlapping and contested claims. 
Data management and analysis 
The volume of text critically evaluated in this study would have been difficult to 
manage without a systematic method of organization and abstraction. Qualitative 
9 
methodology literature contains a range of techniques that can guide such processes, all of 
which require that the researcher comprehend data, ascribe preliminary meanings, theorize 
relationships, and contextualize data into findings. Most of the methodological literature 
reviewed for this project describes such content or thematic analysis in the context of 
interview-based research (Thorne et al., 2004; Dunn, 2005; Cope, 2005; Ryan and Bernard, 
2003, 2000; Kirby and McKenna, 1989). A number of these techniques proved useful to this 
project. 
Following methods outlined by Waitt (2005), Dunn (2005), Cope (2005), Ryan and 
Bernard (2003, 2000), and Kirby and McKenna (1989), I employed an iterative process of 
constant comparative analysis, involving a systematic process of reading, interpreting 
meanings, and identifying sections of text relevant to the subject of inquiry. An entirely 
digital process was employed: documents were scanned, sections of text were copied to a 
database, and preliminary descriptions where assigned to each "block" of text. Through a 
process of comparative analysis, I developed and filed "blocks" of text into broad categories 
based on the meanings of text and their relationships. This stage is often referred to as 
developing a codebook (Waitt, 2005; Cope, 2005; Kirby and McKenna, 1989). 
Thematic coding was necessarily an iterative process as categories merged, split, and 
new categories emerged. From these thematic categories I drew a number of analytic themes, 
from which theories and arguments were developed (Waitt, 2005; Cope, 2005; Dunn, 2005; 
Ryan and Bernard, 2003, 2000). Employing a technique of constant comparative analysis 
resulted in a highly iterative process. Preliminary categories often needed to be reformulated 
based on comparison of text within and between groupings. Despite this, the information 
management process employed proved efficient and systematic, moving from a collection of 
unorganized text to a categorized, described, and coded set of data from which the concepts 
10 
and arguments presented in the following chapters have been drawn. 
Document structure 
The organization of this document follows a somewhat standard format for theses. 
This introduction is followed by a theory chapter, where I introduce a number of key 
conceptual considerations on which I have drawn. The theory chapter is presented in two 
sections. The first focuses on how identity, narrative, and law are implicated in the social 
production of territory and boundaries, and the role of boundaries in the production of socio-
spatial identities across axes of time and geographic scale. In the second section I relate this 
conceptual understanding to historic (that is, pre-colonial) indigenous territoriality and tenure. 
The goal here is not to attempt to define the indigenous connection to land, for such a task 
would be impossible, but to expose an understanding of how axes of time and geographic 
scale are contingent aspects of indigenous socio-spatial identities. 
Chapter 3 presents an analysis of the spatial dimensions of aboriginal rights as 
articulated by Canadian courts, and in particular explicates how different conceptions of 
aboriginal rights are equated with different conceptions of indigenous territorial identity. 
The overarching goal of chapters 2 and 3 is to expose how indigenous socio-spatial identities 
are produced and contested in multiple ways, and in doing so provide insight into the analysis 
of overlapping and contested claims that follows. 
Chapter 4 is the crux of this thesis, where I argue that the issue of overlapping and 
contested claims is indeed problematic in the context of treaty negotiation in British 
Columbia, and that insufficient Crown and judicial engagement on the issue undermines two 
primary goals of the BC treaty process: to promote jurisdictional certainty and avoid 
aboriginal rights litigation. The goal of chapter 4 is to make this case: to illustrate by 
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example an understanding of the causes and implications of overlapping and contested claims, 
and in doing so demonstrate that the current approach of the Crown and the BC Supreme 
Court to the issue undermines the ethical (if not legal) legitimacy of the BC treaty process. 
In the concluding chapter I summarize the findings of this project, suggest several 
possible strategies for working through the issue, and identify potential areas of research 
focused on the reconciliation of overlapping claims. 
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CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS: IDENTITY, 
BOUNDARIES, TERRITORY AND TENURE 
Territory is bounded social space that inscribes some sort of meaning onto areas of 
the physical world (Delaney, 2005; Sack, 1986). The meanings with which territories are 
imbued are highly contextual. Because this thesis is concerned with the incredibly varied 
and complex socio-spatial identities at work in the BC treaty process, a necessarily broad 
definition of "territory" is required. Following the work of authors such as Larsen (2006), 
Delaney (2005), and Sack (1986), I conceive of territory as the social control or influence of 
space, animated by varied forms of social attachment, representation and material-economic 
practice. Territories are enacted through boundaries, which function as markers of 
distinction and relation across a range of socio-spatial and temporal scales (Barth, 2000, 
1969; Cohen, 2000; Paasi, 2000, 1999; Silvern, 1999; Newman and Paasi, 1998; Herb and 
Kaplan, 1999; Knight, 1982). 
Equally important to the meaning of boundaries is the question of why and how 
people struggle over such meanings in the first place, and the contestations that are revealed 
through exploration of what boundaries "do." For what purpose is the concept of territory 
employed? What is the role of territory in the formation of identities, and what part does 
identity play in the production of social space? And, of importance to this project, are 
conventional notions of territories and boundaries applicable to indigenous societies? 
This chapter has two sections. The first is concerned with broad conceptual 
considerations, such as the social production of space, the intertwining of law, space and 
social power, and ways that identity, narrative and law are implicated in the production of 
boundaries across axes of identity, time and geography scale. The second is concerned with 
"traditional" indigenous systems of territoriality and tenure in British Columbia. The 
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overarching intent of this chapter is to highlight a number of conceptual considerations that 
have utility for understanding the meaning and salience of the socio-spatial identities at work 
within the BC treaty process, and to provide context for the discussion of overlapping and 
contested claims that follows. 
Section 1: Law, Boundaries and Territorial Identities 
Imbrications of law, space and power 
Social science in recent years has witnessed a noticeable shift toward an interest in 
the irreducible relationship between space, power and law. Scholars working in this vein 
argue that parochial understandings of law are undermined by theory which recognizes the 
context-specific and spatial contingencies of law, a field that scholars such as Blomley and 
Delaney have characterized as critical legal geography (Blomley, 2008, 2003, 1994; Delaney, 
2004; Delaney et al., 2001). The imperative for Blomley's (1994) seminal Law, Space, and 
the Geographies of Power is the contention that law and geography are often taken as 
independent: that law is too often characterized as an autonomous, self-sufficient field 
separate not only from geography but also from social life. Attention to the theoretical and 
practical implications of these insights has stimulated a wealth of exciting scholarship on 
what Delaney (2004, p. 850) calls the "the twin imperialisms" of law and geography, which 
ventures beyond the bi-disciplinary framework encoded in the term "legal geography" (see 
for example, Brenner and Eldon, 2009; Butler, 2009; Blomley, 2008,2003; Delaney et al., 
2001). In much of this work disciplinary segregation is recognized as an impediment to 
understanding social practice and experience. In "the worlds in which lives are lived, the 
'legal' and 'the geographical' are no more encountered separately than are 'the political' and 
'the economic', 'the social' and 'the sexual,' or any of the other analytical chunks into which 
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scholars are prone to break up reality" (Delaney, 2004, p. 849-850). 
A particularly useful idea employed by critical legal geographers and others is that of 
the (social) production of space, a theoretical perspective initially articulated by French 
philosopher Lefebvre (1991/1974). This theory begins with the contention that "(social) 
space is a product" (p. 56), and that space "serves as a tool of thought and action [..,] control, 
and hence of domination and power..." (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 26). Lefebvre regards space not 
as a physical location or commodity but as a political instrument within a system of 
communication and agency (Lefebvre, 1991; see also Butler, 2009, 2007; Brenner and Eldon, 
2009; Merrifield, 2000). Lefebvre's principle argument is that "common-sense" philosophies 
have structured dominant understandings of spatial relations, and that space is properly 
understood not only through the interrogation of physical space, but also through cognitive 
and lived dimensions (Lefebvre, 1991). 
Lefebvre (1991) posits a conceptual triad for understanding the social production of 
space: 1) physical spatial practices such as everyday routines, networks and pathways 
through which social life is produced and reproduced; 2) abstract representations of space 
produced by "experts" within power-infused institutional apparatus, and; 3) representational 
spaces of lived experience, social imagery, and resistance (see also Brenner and Eldon, 2009, 
2009, 2007; Merrifield, 2000). It is through the simultaneous operation of these three 
dimensions - physical, cognitive and lived - that space is intimately tied to the production of 
social relations, where space is not only part of the apparatus of social regulation but a 
instrument of political struggle and resistance (Lefebvre, 1991; Larsen, 2006; Merrifield, 
2000). 
There are many examples of this in the context of indigenous peoples and colonialism, 
ranging from the imposition of English common law on indigenous societies (for example 
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the creation of Indian Reserves in British Columbia), to more subtle operations of law that, 
through the production of space, order the manner in which indigenous people (and in fact all 
people) experience social life (see for example Egan, 2008; Harris, 2004, 2002; Brown, 
2002; Brealey, 1995). Space, in this context, is also an instrument of struggle and resistance, 
which is often mobilized not only by the state and other powerful actors but by indigenous 
groups seeking to resist law or use it to their advantage (Larsen, 2006; Blomley, 2003; 
Morris and Fondahl, 2002; Silvern, 1999; Sparke, 1998). The long history of indigenous 
groups pressing their territorial claims in courts of law is an example of this, but one in which 
there is clearly an uneven distribution of power, where those with the capacity to shape and 
employ law are better able to mobilize it in the production and reproduction of space 
(Panagos, 2007; Borrows, 1999; Sparke, 1998). 
The concept of land-as-property in particular exposes the fusion of law, space and 
power (Blomley, 2005; Delaney, 2005, 2004; Delaney et al., 2001). In Western societies the 
conventional understanding of property tends to dominate other understandings, where 
"property" is understood to mean "private property" owned by an individual or corporate 
entity. Certainly law, through the imposition of property categories and contractual relations, 
is implicated in the reproduction of the dominant conception of land-as-property (Butler, 
2009; Blomley, 2005, 2003; Delaney, 2004). In this way space and law are simultaneously 
employed as an instrument that reproduces hegemonic order (through, for example, the 
taken-for-granted representation of space as private property), while at the same time serving 
as a medium for resistance (Lefebvre, 1991; see also Larsen, 2006). As discussed in more 
detail later, in one sense the phenomena of overlapping territorial claims can be understood 
as an implicit (and perhaps unintentional) challenge to the taken-for-granted practice of 
representing space as mutually exclusive property. 
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Boundaries 
Boundaries are social constructs that occupy a crucial position in the production and 
maintenance of identity, just as identity is implicated in the production of space. The past 
two decades have witnessed renewed interest in socio-spatial identities, in which geographers 
and others have sought to understand the production of identities and boundaries and the 
relationships between them (Legare, 2008; Newman, 2006; Fondahl and Sirina, 2003; Paasi, 
2000, 1999; Herb and Kaplan, 1999; Newman and Paasi, 1998). 
The word "boundary," to an English speaker, represents a constellation of ideas, "a 
schema for conceptualizing the very idea of distinction" which evokes images ranging from a 
line drawn on the ground to abstract distinctions of socio-spatial organization (Barth, 2000, p. 
20). Barth (2000) argues that the concept of boundaries embodies three levels of 
abstraction: 1) literal boundaries that divide territories "on the ground"; 2) abstract 
boundaries that distinguish social groups from each other; and 3) cognitive boundaries that 
"provide a template for that which separates distinct categories of the mind" (Barth, 2000, 
p. 17). The concerns of academic disciplines - themselves more or less segregated by 
disciplinary boundaries - have led scholars to emphasize one or more of these abstractions 
(Delaney, 2005). 
Political geographers, for example, have often treated boundaries as physical and 
static outcomes of political processes, where territory is understood as an inert container 
reflecting the ability of one group, often the state, to produce and at times superimpose 
physical boundaries of separation on another (Newman, 2006; Delaney, 2005; Sack, 1986). 
More recently the concept of boundaries increasingly refers to symbolic distinctions between 
social groups which may or may not find spatial expression (Newman, 2006; Delaney, 2005; 
Newman and Passi, 1998). 
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Anthropologists and sociologists, for their part, have concerned themselves with 
understanding (and at times debunking) binary distinctions between "different" social groups 
across a range of social and physical scales (Poata-Smith, 2004; Barth, 2000, 1969; Cohen, 
2000; Herb and Kaplan, 1999; Gupta and Ferguson, 1997). In this context the term 
"boundaries" is often used to describe distinctions of group belonging and as an analytical 
tool to expose the way in which inclusion and exclusion are institutionalized (Newman, 
2006; Cohen, 2000; Paasi, 1999; Sibley, 1995). Boundaries thus have "their own internal 
dynamics, causing change in their own right as much as they are simply the physical outcome 
of decision-making" (Newman, 2006; p. 146). Boundaries, in this view, are as much 
perceived as they are visible manifestations of political will or force. 
Boundaries are conditional aspects of collective identity often represented in terms of 
belonging or not belonging at a particular time, rather than based on intrinsic markers of 
distinction essential to a particular group (Poata-Smith, 2004; Niezen, 2003; Barth, 2000; 
Gupta and Ferguson, 1997). It has even been argued that there would be no identities 
without boundaries because boundaries are the means by which identity is enacted through 
processes of "othering" (Barth, 1969). Whether boundaries are internally enacted or 
externally imposed (or both), the concept is imbued with the notion that identities are 
produced through boundaries and boundaries are produced through the formation and 
maintenance of identities (Paasi, 2000; Barth, 2000, 1969; Cohen, 2000; Herb and Kaplan, 
1999; Gupta and Ferguson, 1997). Boundaries and identities are two sides of the same coin 
(Paasi, 2000, 1999). 
Boundaries reflect cultural experience and are contextually contingent. To 
understand the meaning of boundaries in different contexts requires distinguishing between 
the cognitive premises that produce boundaries - what Barth (2000), calls "acts of imposition 
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- and the sociology of people living and acting around that boundary" (p. 30). 
Boundary narratives and discursive landscapes 
Foucault (1980) argues that knowledge and power are irreducible, and that 
institutional power arises at least as much from the ability to shape discourse as it does from 
the use or threat of force (see also Nadasdy, 2003; Philo, 2000). By defining the domain of 
"reasonable" thought, powerful institutions (for example courts and universities) often do not 
need to resort to coercive force to shape conceptual understanding of boundaries and 
territoriality (Delaney, 2005; Paasi, 1999). Identity, boundaries and the connections between 
them may be active in a manner in which knowledge and power are practically invisible, 
which obscures the sources of social norms that frame such distinctions (Paasi, 1999). 
Boundaries are thus part of the "discursive landscapes" (Kakli, 1999) of social power, which 
if examined can expose contestations of meaning between socio-spatial actors (Thom, 2009; 
Paasi, 2000, 1999; Newman and Paasi, 1998; Gupta and Ferguson, 1997). 
Boundaries, then, may be visible or invisible and are embedded within and shaped by 
explicit and implicit social norms. They are equally political, social, and discursive 
constructs often oriented toward actualizing a desired match between space and identity, and 
vice versa. Narratives such as those centered on nationalism and private property, for 
example, tend to express territorial identity in strongly essentialist terms that serve to 
legitimate the exclusion of "outsiders" and to affirm who "we" are (Blomley, 2005; Delaney, 
2004; Newman and Paasi, 1998). Such simplified conceptions, however, obscure the 
contested nature of power and meaning, and are contrasted with those conceived not as a 
reflection of essential "facts" but as discursively created and subject to contingencies of 
social power. 
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Herb and Kaplan (1999) argue that bounded space is "the crucial element in the 
tension between power and identity," and that identity is "negotiated"5 across a range of 
geographic scales (p. 10; see also Legare, 2008; Delaney, 2005; Silvern, 1999; Knight, 1982). 
The conceptualization of territorial identities - that is, identities that are bounded by space 
and time - however, is challenged by a constant limitation. Identities are rarely if ever 
homogeneous and mutually exclusive, but rather are dynamic and contested products of the 
discursive landscapes within which they are produced. Gupta and Ferguson (1997), for 
example, contend that representations of space in the social sciences are remarkably 
dependent on problematic images of distinction. "The clearest illustration of this kind of 
thinking are the classic ethnographic maps that purport to display the distribution of peoples, 
tribes and cultures" (Gupta and Ferguson, 1997, p. 34). In this way, "space itself becomes a 
kind of neutral grid on which cultural difference, historical memory, and societal 
organization is inscribed" (Gupta and Ferguson, 1997, p. 34). Such assumed naturalisms are 
worthy of attention, in particular "the ethnographic habit of taking the association of a 
culturally unitary group (the 'tribe' or 'people') and 'its' territory as natural" (Gupta and 
Ferguson, 1997, p. 40). 
The tendency to ascribe as natural what is in fact socially produced raises important 
questions in the context of overlapping territorial claims: how is socio-spatial identity defined 
for those who continually cross boundaries? How do we account for multiple "cultures" 
within one locality? How do we account for and represent cultural transformation within 
space and, of particular interest to this project, "does the colonial encounter create a 'new 
culture' in both the colonized and colonizing country?" (Gupta and Ferguson, 1997, p. 34-35) 
5 While identity is often said to be "negotiable," this characterization neglects inequalities between actors in such 
processes. In is certainly arguable, for example, that the ability of indigenous peoples in Canada to "negotiate" their 
identities was compromised when they were classified into Indian Act-defined Bands by the state without much 
regard for indigenous markers of distinction (see for example Harris, 2002; Cohen, 2000). 
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Overlapping orientations and allegiances 
The conceptual vulnerability suggested by such questions is consistent with what 
Agnew (1995) calls the "territorial trap," a feint that social scientists and others have 
followed by taking territory as a prefatory given without consideration of processes 
implicated in its production. Socio-spatial identities are rarely "pure" even though they are 
often represented as such. Understanding discursive processes of "purification" - that is, how 
social groups and "their" territories are represented as "natural" and given - requires context-
specific interrogation of the forces producing such narratives and how they operate across 
spatial and temporal scales (Silvern, 1999; Paasi, 1999; Herb and Kaplan, 1999; Newman 
and Paasi, 1998). 
de Vos (1975), for example, contends that people employ nested priorities in the 
formation of identity allegiances. While there are innumerable axes along which identities 
are formed, here I reference just three of the orientations suggested by de Vos (1975): 1) 
allegiance to a present-functional identity based on a participatory relationship between the 
state and individuals or groups; 2) a past-familial-cultural allegiance that may well be tied to 
specific territory, whether currently occupied or not; and 3) a future-ideological identity, 
where dissatisfaction with past and/or present orientations may prompt identification with a 
cause or counter-hegemonic movement (de Vos, 1975; see also Knight, 1982). While there 
are myriad intervening variables, for example class, property ownership, law, gender, and so 
on, allegiances of these kinds often find expression in state, sub-state and regional spatialities 
(Larsen, 2006; Delaney, 2005; Kaplan, 1999; Paasi, 1999; Knight, 1982). 
Identity allegiances can extend beyond the scale of the state, particularly where 
allegiance with political goals such as the pursuit of the rights of indigenous peoples 
crystallize to fit specific challenges. More often identity allegiances "nest within" state 
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apparatus, where regional or political affiliation finds purchase with individual loyalty. 
Added to this complexity is the fact that people have the ability to switch between levels of 
abstraction at particular points in time, where allegiance to an identity may be mobilized in 
pursuit of political goals both within and beyond state apparatus simultaneously (Larsen, 
2006; Poata-Smith, 2004; Herb and Kaplan, 1999; Gupta and Ferguson, 1997; Knight, 1982). 
Regional conflict occurring throughout the world exposes the variegated and scale-
dependent nature of identity allegiances, for example where individuals may retain loyalty to 
multiple identities, particularly where the function of these identities are compatible (Delaney, 
2005; Herb and Kaplan, 1999). This said, there are clearly cases where concurrent allegiance 
to multiple identities causes tension or even conflict between and within identity groups. 
A stark example of this would be Palisraelestine, where the identity of Palestinians 
living within the state of Israel today is for some more closely aligned with past-familial-
cultural and future-ideological allegiances rather than with a present-functional identity, 
even though all three of these identities overlap spatially and, to a lesser extent, socially 
(Delaney, 2005; Herb and Kaplan, 1999). Allegiance to a past-familial-cultural identity may 
be invoked as a form of moral or legal persuasion, combined with a future-ideological 
orientation to give direction to what is perceived to be in the best interest of particular 
identity groups. In the most extreme cases, those most loyal to a future-ideological 
orientation may even denounce present-functional allegiances (for example denouncing 
citizenship) and seek to destroy through acts of violence what is perceived to be in opposition 
to their future-ideological goals (Delaney, 2005; Herb and Kaplan, 1999; Knight, 1982). 
Past-familial-cultural and future-ideological identities may well be tied to specific territory, 
but these may be at odds with a present-functional identity, particularly where the spatialities 
associated with these allegiances overlap and conflict. 
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The BC treaty process is an example where past-familial-cultural and future-
ideological allegiances have been simultaneously invoked by indigenous groups as both a 
legitimating discourse of claims-making and as a political strategy for actualizing rights and 
benefits. As discussed further in chapter 4, the territorial identities at work within (and 
beyond) the BC process can also oscillate between levels of abstraction and spatio-temporal 
scales. Key to understanding such flexibility is recognition of the hierarchical nature of 
territorial identities and their connection with the social norms, practices and discourses 
through which they are created and sustained (Paasi, 2000). Allegiances that span 
boundaries can become problematic when differently defined territorial identities come in 
contact, particularly when the spatialities associated with these identities overlap in 
incompatible ways. Important in examining such tensions is not only the demarcation of 
physical boundaries and the rules and narratives that delineate membership, but how such 
boundaries are created, institutionalized, and affirmed though cultural norms (Legare, 2008; 
Newman, 2006; Paasi, 2000,1999; Cohen, 2000). At stake here are not only "mechanical" 
issues of physical boundaries, but contestations over the meanings of boundaries and the 
forces implicated in their production. 
Section summary 
The intent of this section was to underscore the complexity of socio-spatial identities, 
to conceptualize the links between identity and territory that are produced and reproduced 
across axes of spatial and temporal scales, and to show that territorial identities are 
contingent aspects of social practice and discourse. The point to emphasize here is that space 
is a social product, and that the role of identity, discourse and law cannot be left out of a 
meaningful contemplation of the indigenous socio-spatial identities at work within (and 
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beyond) the BC treaty process. 
Territories have meanings: they unify and differentiate and are powerful geopolitical 
tools in the hands of those who delineate them (Delaney et al., 2001). The meanings of 
territories are formed within discursive landscapes and are manifestations of power 
configurations that exist among and between social actors. Power in this context refers 
particularly to the role of discourse and law in defining and institutionalizing boundaries. 
Section 2: Indigenous Boundaries: Toward an Understanding of Indigenous 
Territoriality and Tenure 
The concept of boundaries serves analytic purposes, but it should not be assumed that 
all societies have such concepts (Thom, 2009; Barth, 2000; Ingold, 1987). Understanding 
territory in different contexts requires consideration of the ideological, political, and 
historical relationships of the people who define and live within territory, and whether in fact 
the dominant Western notion of territory is even applicable. This said, to be human is to 
have relationships, whether with others or the natural world, and all relationships embody 
elements of association and disassociation (Barth, 1969). From such a perspective, 
understanding territory "becomes an empirical question of what concepts and mental 
operations are used by a group of people to construct their world" (Barth, 2000, p. 34), be 
they territory, boundaries or other forms of cognitive and socio-spatial organization. 
It would be equally inappropriate to assume that indigenous socio-spatial organization 
is not consistent with such concepts, for to do so may perpetuate essentialist ideas about 
indigeneity, such as those that portray indigenous peoples as strictly "traditional" and 
somehow beyond the influence of the forces that continually produce and reproduce identity 
and space. The colonial encounter has produced vast transformations to many facets of 
indigenous societies the world over, not least to their territorial identities (see for example 
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Larsen, 2006; Windsor and McVey, 2005; Harris, 2004,2002; Fondahl and Sirina, 2003; 
Davies, 2003; Brown, 2002; Karppi, 2001). In British Columbia state-imposed physical 
boundaries such as those delineating Indian Reserves and regimes of resource management 
have undermined pre-colonial systems of indigenous governance and territoriality, inhibited 
group interaction, and provoked divergence of indigenous identities (Alfred 2009; Harris, 
2004, 2002; Brown, 2002; Brealey, 1995). In many instances, however, customary systems 
of landholding and governance are not archaic relics but institutions that function to this day, 
and have the capacity to work as equals to the imported system of property law (see for 
example, Keyoh Huwunline, 2011; Napoleon, 2009; Daly, 2005; Overstall, 2005; Borrows, 
2005, 2002; Peeling, 2004). 
While acknowledging that a distinction between "traditional" and "contemporary" 
forms of indigenous territoriality and governance is ambiguous and imperfect, the following 
discussion is nonetheless couched in the past-tense to avoid essentialist tendencies, and to 
provide a view of traditional systems of indigenous territoriality and landholding that existed 
prior to the influence of colonial law and discourse. The scope of this topic is large; hence 
much of much of this section is intended to suggest rather than be definitive, to highlight by 
example rather than exhaustively delve into the concepts and processes identified. By 
employing such an approach I undoubtedly open myself up to criticism for presenting 
abstractions that might seem timeless or placeless. In light of this concern, I will make my 
intent explicit. The goal of this section is not to attempt to define the indigenous connection 
to land, for such a task would be impossible, but to expose an understanding of how axes of 
time and geographic scale are contingent aspects of indigenous territorial identities, and by 
doing so provide context for the examination of overlapping and contested claims that 
follows. 
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Contested meanings and the faculty of language 
If we are to arrive at meaningful generalizations about indigenous socio-spatial 
organization we must be reasonably confident of the meaning of the terms we employ. The 
terms "tenure" and "territory" are particularly relevant. In conventional use, the former 
denotes a greater degree of proprietorship than the latter, in that it refers to both an object and 
the social relationships that operate on and around the object. Tenure, in this sense, is 
conventionally understood as a form of property, whereas territory is bounded social space 
that may inscribe myriad other meanings. To extend this distinction to the context of an 
indigenous relationship with land would be to rely on a common understanding of the term 
"property." Indeed, the apparently endless debate over whether or not "hunting-gatherer 
societies"6 owned the land they used and occupied hinges on, among other things, the 
meaning of the word "property," if such translation is possible at all. 
A number of authors have suggested that property is best understood as a field of 
social relations, encompassing both symbolic and material elements, within which individual 
and collective identities are formed (Delaney, 2004; Nadasdy, 2003; Ingold, 1987; see also 
Thom, 2005; McLaren et al., 2005; Overstall, 2005; Blomley, 2005,2003; Borrows, 1999). 
If we define property in such a manner, it follows that all people have, and have always had, 
property. Such a contention echoes Bell and Asch's (1997) assertion that "because they are 
human beings, Aboriginal people at the time of the assertion of British sovereignty did live in 
societies that were organized and had institutions respecting land ownership as well as 
jurisdiction over members and territory" (p. 72). Equally important to the meaning of 
property is the question of why and how people struggle over the meaning of property and 
6 While still widely used, the term "hunter-gatherer societies" may be an inadequate descriptor when considered in 
light of the growing body of scholarship indicating that indigenous peoples of what is now British Columbia not only 
occupied and used but in many instances actively cultivated land in ways not readily cognizable to colonial settlers 
(see for example Deur and Turner, 2005; Turner and Jones, 2000). 
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territory in the first place, and the contestations that are revealed through exploration of what 
territory and property "do" (Nadasdy, 2003). 
Barth (2000), for example, argues that to appreciate the meaning of indigenous 
boundaries we need to "distinguish between the cognitive premises that construct the 
boundary," the subtleties of local language, and the "sociology of people living and acting 
around that boundary and thereby shaping an outcome" (p. 30-31). In this phenomenological 
view, territorial organization is understood as a set of concepts operating in the minds of 
those who animate boundaries: a constellation of ideas that function as a cognitive model for 
territorial behaviour (Barth, 2000; Ingold, 1987). What many nonhuman animals achieve by 
physical posturing, humans achieve through linguistic and symbolic communication (Barth 
2000; Ingold, 1987). The word "territory," then, confers elements of both noun and verb, in 
that it communicates and enacts relationships among people and between people and land. 
Such processes depend upon the faculty of language, and particularly on the ability of 
language to animate agency and displacement by communicating to persons and locales 
remote in time and space (Barth, 2000). 
In conventional (English-language) discourses, such as those centred on property, 
emphasis is on boundaries as markers of distinction and discrimination. According to authors 
such as Thom (2009, 2005), Egan (2008), Barth (2000), and Ingold (1987) indigenous 
boundaries are primarily a means by which relationships, and not property, are modulated 
and governed. The argument here is based on qualitative differences between cognitive 
categories and phenomenologically derived understanding, and the manner in which these 
understandings are reconciled within different cultures (Cohen, 2000). Such an approach 
sees indigenous territoriality as lived experience: as a system of understanding that comes 
from close connections between people and land and the identities that flow from such 
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connections. 
Such close connections are evident in the findings of authors such as Thom (2005), 
Overstall (2005), Turner et al. (2005), and Marsden (2002, 2001), who contend that some 
indigenous people see themselves as coming into existence in relation to land, where people 
are understood as descended from supernatural entities embedded within physical landscape. 
Such a conception of belonging invokes an image not of displacement but of cooperation, 
where territoriality flows from bonds of kinship, responsibility and reciprocity. In this way 
indigenous territoriality may not so much be based on imaging of physical boundaries as it is 
a means of ordering social relations and practical conduct in the use and care of land (Ingold, 
1987). 
Drawing on Ingold's (1987) metaphor of a meshwork of relations, for example, Thom 
(2009) argues that territoriality for the Coast Salish is best understood as a fabric of 
"permeable boundaries of paths and itineraries, structured not to physically impede 
movement or exclude others, but to provide for the social interaction of different social 
groups within common places" (p. 186). In this view, territorial identities were imbued with 
historical and affinal contingency based on what Bird-David (1999, p. 68) calls a "relational 
epistemology," where boundaries of territorial identity were enacted more as a way of 
knowing relations of kin and place than a way of ordering jurisdiction and property (Thom, 
2009, 2005). In the context of the Coast Salish, Thom (2009) echoes Ingold's (1987) 
contention that indigenous boundaries are "more like sign posts than fences, comprising part 
of a system of practical communication rather than social control" (Ingold, 1987, p. 156-157). 
This is not to say that all indigenous groups in what is now British Columbia 
employed these kinds of "boundaries." The point to underscore here is that the concept of 
property is only one of many ways that people understand their connection to the natural 
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world. As Overstall (2005) eloquently shows, affinal relations for the Gitksan of northern 
British Columbia extend beyond the human realm to include spiritual beings embedded in the 
land itself. "These relationships are not 'property' in the sense that any of us, I hope, think 
we own our partners, parents, or children. Yet, in some other sense, they are still 'ours' and 
we are 'theirs'" (Overstall, 2005; p. 23). 
Indigenous boundaries: Patterns of indigenous territoriality and tenure 
Appreciation of systems of indigenous territoriality requires understanding that goes 
beyond conventional notions of land as discretely bounded property. Such complexity has 
led many to mistake different ways of knowing land and "property" for there being no 
boundaries at all (Harris, 2004; Turner and et al., 2005). Within colonial discourse the self-
serving conception of land-as-property was (and is) dominant, and conveniently affirmed the 
assumption that the indigenous inhabitants of what is now British Columbia (hereafter "the 
region") were not really using much of the land they occupied, and did not employ concepts 
of ownership to the land and resources they used (Turner et al. 2005, Harris, 2004; McLaren 
et al., 2005).7 
In fact the lands and waters of the region were occupied, governed and sometimes 
cultivated by indigenous peoples thousands of years prior to European colonization (Turner 
et al. 2005; Turner and Jones, 2000; see also studies related to specific indigenous groups 
such as Napoleon, 2009; Larsen, 2006; Thom, 2005; Daly, 2005; Overstall, 2005; Brown, 
2002; Marsden, 2002, 2001; Sterrit et al., 1998; Furniss, 1995; Marsden and Galois, 1995). 
Indigenous peoples throughout the region enacted varied forms of land tenure that governed 
resource use and distribution within and among communities, extended families, and other 
7 Philosophical justification for this reasoning is often traced to Locke's (1689/1952) idea of property being created 
through enclosure or application of agrarian labour (see for example McLaren et al., 2005). 
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forms of social organization. 
Drawing on ethnographic and historical sources, as well as on oral histories of 
indigenous people, Turner and Jones (2000) argue that indigenous groups throughout the 
region generally employed one of two models of territoriality and tenure, "ranging from 
community control of territory at the tribal level [...] to more explicitly focused hereditary 
ownership and control of land" (p. 30). Within these systems, "ownership rights might be 
held by individuals, by culturally defined kinship groups (such as households, lineages, or 
clans), or by larger village and ethnic groupings" (Turner et al., 2005, p. 152). 
The first model is generally typical of inland and southern coast areas where there 
were generally less strictly regulated controls on land use and occupancy for those identified 
as kin and allies within a tribal territory (Turner and Jones, 2000; see also Thom, 2009, 2005; 
Egan, 2008; Larsen, 2006). The second model was a more "strictly and rigorously defined 
social system of land use and ownership by specific descent groups, lineages, 'houses,' or 
clans, each headed by a hereditary chief and each laying specific claim to particular tracks of 
land with strictly defined boundaries, usually at the watershed scale" (Turner and Jones, 2000, 
p. 6; see also for example Napoleon, 2009; Daly, 2005; Overstall, 2005; Marsden, 2002, 
2001; Sterrit et al., 1998). 
I use the term "tenure" as a system of rights, obligations and protocol governing land 
and resource use and ownership,8 including the right to control access to and use of land and 
resources (Turner et al., 2005). Such tenures reflected a high level of complexity and 
diversity throughout the region, as did the languages, cultures and economic systems of those 
8 The term "ownership" is here purposefully used to embody the meaning of proprietary rights in land and resources, 
while at the same time acknowledging that the widely understood meaning falls well short of more nuanced 
understandings of land and resources within indigenous world view generally. While admitting that much is lost in 
translation, not to use the term "ownership," especially in the context of claims making, may be to conceal the 
proprietary interest it confers. 
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who enacted them. Control of land and resources was irreducibly tied to the resource 
requirements and economic system of particular groups (Deur and Turner, 2005; Turner and 
Jones, 2000). In areas where territorial boundaries were less strictly defined for kin and 
allies, land and resource tenure was often held at the level of extended family, and nested 
within a broader territorial identity (Turner et al. 2005; Turner and Jones, 2000; Thom 2009, 
2005). Such protocol varied from group to group, often in relation to the distribution, 
scarcity and value of particular resources (Deur and Turner, 2005). Access to some types of 
resources was sometimes more tightly controlled than others, where controls were more 
stringent for resources that were highly valued or intensively cultivated (Turner et al., 2005; 
Turner and Jones, 2000). 
Exogamous marriage and diplomatic alliance extended networks of travel and 
resource harvesting. In such instances tenures were sometimes time-bound and restricted to 
particular resources without ownership of other resources at the same location (Turner at al., 
2005; Turner and Jones, 2000). Thus specific harvesting areas were sometimes used by 
multiple indigenous groups in places where affinal and other types of social arrangement 
allowed shared and sanctioned use. Such rights were regulated by protocol, disputes over 
which were mediated though diplomacy or warfare (Turner et al., 2005; Turner and Jones, 
2000). 
In systems where territorial boundaries were more explicitly defined, territorial 
ownership was inherited or bestowed through customary protocol. Such rights and 
obligations were legally bestowed and transferred though institutional practices such as the 
potlatch, and affirmed though totemic poles, crests, songs and dances (see for example Daly, 
2005; Turner and Jones, 2000; Overstall, 2005; Marsden, 2002, 2001; Sterritt et al., 1998). 
The ability to exclude and control access was an important dimension of tenure, where the 
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meaning of tenure was imbued with the responsibility for the care of the land and sharing of 
resources. In systems with more rigorously defined territories, the need for precise territorial 
boundaries was an aspect of the legal and spiritual reciprocity between a group and its 
territory, where boundaries defined the extent of responsibility for stewardship (Overstall, 
2005). Rights and responsibilities of tenure were defined through indigenous legal order, 
"whether through communal territories with known boundaries in combination with 
ownership of key resources, or through strictly defined descent groups owning extensive 
tracts of land and multiple resources from which others were forcibly excluded" (Turner et 
al., 2005, p. 176). 
Indigenous territoriality and the axes of time and geographic scale 
Boundaries mean different things in different cultural settings. Polities, linguistic 
groups, property and so on, can all be represented by different kinds of boundaries, just as the 
same category (say, tenure) can be delineated in different ways. While such complexity may 
make it tempting to conclude that many indigenous groups simply shared territories and 
resources, this kind of characterization oversimplifies the meaning of tenure in the context of 
pre-colonial indigenous societies. While it may also be an oversimplification to say that 
indigenous groups of the region "owned" territory, certainly indigenous groups of the region 
employed different forms of tenure respecting land and resources, and that the concept of 
tenure was imbued with the meaning of "belonging" or ownership. As a field of social 
relations, property (or perhaps better, "belonging") is an important node of connection 
between identity, history and space. The generalizations offered above suggest that for 
indigenous societies of the region such attachment operated along multiple axes: in some 
instances as discretely bounded territorial space, and in others as rights and responsibilities to 
specific areas or resources, nested within a broader territorial identity. 
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A salient distinction here again is between the meaning of the terms "territory" and 
"tenure." Ingold's (1987) imaging of geometric surfaces exposes tenure as having three 
patterns of spatialization: zero-dimensional, relating to specific sites or locations; one-
dimensional, relating to routes of travel and harvesting "trails;" and two-dimensional, 
relating to explicitly bounded areas. In societies where two-dimensional areal tenure was the 
norm, such as those described by Turner and Jones (2000, p. 6) as having a "strictly and 
rigorously defined social system of land use and ownership [...] with strictly defined 
boundaries," territorial boundaries ascribed meaning of proprietorship, jurisdiction and 
territorial sovereignty (see for example Napoleon, 2009; Daly, 2005; Overstall, 2005; 
Marsden, 2002, 2001; Sterritt et al., 1998). In societies that had less strictly defined 
boundaries for kin and allies, territoriality can be understood to reflect a level of social 
organization beyond the family and village, for example the extent of a group's travel and 
ties of kinship, within which different forms of tenure were nested (see for example Thom, 
2009, 2005; Egan, 2008; Turner et al., 2005). While it may well be appropriate to ascribe a 
broad territorial identity to these latter kinds of groups as well, it is clear that the meaning of 
the term "territory" in this context - the "something else" that territory describes - is very 
different from the "strictly defined boundaries" enacted by some other groups. 
Chapter summary 
The goal of the chapter has been to highlight a number of conceptual considerations 
that have utility for understanding the meaning and salience of territory in the context of 
overlapping and contested claims. Important concepts reviewed in the first section are the 
social production of space, the intertwining of law, space and social power, and ways that 
identity, narrative, and law are implicated in the production of boundaries across axes of 
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identity, time and geographic scale. 
The second section of this chapter sought to provide a generalized explanation of 
"traditional" patterns of indigenous territorially and tenure in what is now British Columbia. 
I have attempted to clarify some of the key terms that this review required, and in doing so 
have also exposed the challenge of such cross-cultural translation. Given the culturally 
contingent nature of boundaries, it should be no surprise that indigenous territoriality has 
been produced in markedly different ways by different indigenous societies. The point to 
emphasize here is that territory and tenure were given meaning by indigenous legal orders -
systems that in some instances remain vibrant to this day - and that such systems can provide 
a conceptual and legal framework for examining territorial claims. 
Understanding such boundaries comes not through the imposition of the language of 
property, but through understanding geopolitical history, indigenous legal orders, and the 
ways that the territorial "sign posts" of each group have evolved over time. Throughout both 
sections of this review, the dimensions of time and geographic scale are crucially important 
to the production of space, where the formation of boundaries may give rise to a divergence 
of identities and the overlap of territories. Such territorial identities are not only of academic 
concern, for these identities and boundaries are potent realities in political and legal spheres. 
The conceptual framework presented in this chapter exposes the age-old problem at the heart 
of indigenous claims negotiation the world over, that of how best to give political recognition 
to these identities. 
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CHAPTER 3: INDIGENOUS TERRITORIAL IDENTITY AND THE "LENS" 
OF JURISPRUDENCE 
An often repeated mantra of the BC treaty process is that it is not a forum for the 
assertion of legal rights, but a space for dialogue and the negotiation of "interests" (Egan, 
2008; Penikett, 2006; Woolford, 2005; de Costa, 2002). This said, ultimately treaties are 
legal documents within the meaning of s. 35(1) of the Constitution of Canada9 and their 
negotiation is compelled and shaped by the legal doctrine of aboriginal rights (Richmond, 
2007; Scholtz 2006; Foster 2002; Borrows, 2001,2000,1999). As discussed in chapter 4, all of 
the modern treaty agreements reached in British Columbia have been challenged in court 
because of overlapping and contested claims. The goal of this chapter is to provide a 
jurisprudential backdrop for the discussion that follows, by addressing a set of questions 
concerning the legal dimensions of overlapping and contested claims: 1) what are the spatial 
dimensions of aboriginal rights?; 2) what legal principals have been employed by Canadian 
courts to define the bounds of indigenous territorial identity?; and 3) how and to what extent 
have Canadian courts recognized aboriginal rights in instances where asserted rights of 
different indigenous groups overlap spatially? 
The doctrine of aboriginal rights is a body of Canadian common law10 that defines the 
constitutional relationship between the Canadian state and the aboriginal peoples of Canada 
(Murphy, 2009; Borrows and Rotman, 2007; McNeil, 2002; Foster, 2002). There are a 
number of distinct branches of this body of law. The branch dealing specifically with 
aboriginal rights of territorial jurisdiction is the doctrine of aboriginal title (Newman and 
Schweitzer, 2008; Borrows and Rotman, 2007; Newman, 2007; Slattery, 2006, 2000; McNeil, 
9 In 1982, the Canadian Constitution was amended to, among other things, "recognize and affirm" the "treaty and 
aboriginal rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada" (Constitution Act, 1982, s. 35(1)). 
10 By "Canadian common law" I mean the unwritten law applied by Canadian courts, whether in common or civil 
jurisdictions. In the sphere of aboriginal rights, the common law operates uniformly across Canada (Slattery, 2000). 
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2006, 2000; Borrows, 2000, 1999). 
Indigenous territorial identity and Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1997) 
In Delgamuukw v. British Columbia ("Delgamuukw", 1997) the Supreme Court of 
Canada considered the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en Nations' claim for ownership and 
jurisdiction over a large area of (what is now) northwestern British Columbia. On appeal the 
case was framed as a claim for "Aboriginal title and self-government" (at para. 72; see also 
Newman, 2007; Borrows and Rotman, 2007; Slattery, 2006, 2000; McNeil, 2006, 2000; 
Borrows, 2001, 1999). While "errors of fact made by the trial judge" (at para. 170) made it 
impossible for the court to make a declaration of whether aboriginal title exists in the claimed 
area (a new trial was ordered but not pursued), the court articulated some of the spatial 
dimensions of aboriginal title and provided guidance on how aboriginal title would be 
cognizable to courts in future cases. 
Prior exclusive occupation 
Aboriginal rights (including aboriginal title) are predicated on the principal of prior 
occupation (Newman, 2007; McNeil, 2006; Slattery, 2006,2000). What makes aboriginal 
title a sui generis (legally unique) property right is that it arises from indigenous occupation 
and/or jurisdictional control of land prior to the assertion of British sovereignty, whereas 
normal estates, like fee simple, arise afterward {Delgamuukw, 1997, at para 114; see also for 
example Newman, 2007; Slattery, 2006,2000; McNeil, 2000). While the "prior" component 
of prior occupation is sometimes equated with "original" occupation, the court has yet to 
engage in an instance where multiple indigenous groups claim to have occupied or controlled 
the same land at different times prior to the assertion of British sovereignty (discussed below). 
The "occupation " component of the doctrine of prior occupation is an equally problematic 
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criterion, and is discussed at length below. 
In Delgamuukw (1997), "[t]here was a consensus among the parties on appeal that 
proof of historic occupation was required to make out a claim of aboriginal title" (at para. 
146) but the parties to the litigation disagreed on whether proof of prior occupation should be 
predicated on proof of prior physical occupation (the Crown's argument) or whether proof of 
aboriginal title might be based, at least in part, on customary indigenous law (the plaintiffs' 
argument). In the principal judgment, Chief Justice Lamer (writing for the majority) found it 
instructive to conceptualize aboriginal rights as occurring along a spectrum according to their 
degree of connection with land: 
"At the one end, there are those aboriginal rights which are practices, customs and traditions 
that are integral to the distinctive aboriginal culture of the group claiming the right. [...] In 
the middle, there are activities which, out of necessity, take place on land and indeed, might 
be intimately related to a particular piece of land. At the other end of the spectrum, there is 
aboriginal title itself' (at para. 138). 
The court found that in order to make out a claim of aboriginal title, an indigenous 
group must satisfy the following criteria: 
"(i) the land must have been occupied prior to sovereignty, (ii) if present occupation is relied 
on as proof of occupation pre-sovereignty, there must be a continuity between present and 
pre-sovereignty occupation, and (iii) at sovereignty, that occupation must have been exclusive" 
(Delgamuukw, 1997, at para. 146, emphasis added). 
Prior occupation can be established either by proof of physical occupation at the time 
of Crown sovereignty or in reference to indigenous customary law, or both (Delgamuukw, 
1997, at para. 148, 157; see also Newman, 2007; Grant and Ross, 2006; Slattery, 2006, 2000; 
McNeil, 2006,1999). If proof of physical occupation is employed as proof of occupation, "it 
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may be established in a variety of ways, ranging from the construction of dwellings through 
cultivation and enclosure of fields to regular use of definite tracts of land for hunting, fishing 
or otherwise exploiting its resources" (Delgamuukw, 1997, at para. 149). In making such a 
determination, an indigenous group's "size, manner of life, material resources, and 
technological abilities, and the character of the lands claimed must be taken into account" (at 
p. 10, see also at para. 149). An indigenous groups' "[ojccupancy is determined by reference 
to the activities that have taken place on the land and the uses to which the land has been put 
by the particular group" (at para. 128). 
If, on the other hand indigenous customary law is advanced to make out a claim then 
prior occupation of lands "can be gleaned, in part, but not exclusively, from their traditional 
laws, because those laws were elements of the practices, customs and traditions of aboriginal 
peoples. Relevant [indigenous] laws might include, but are not limited to, a land tenure 
system or laws governing land use" (Delgamuukw, 1997, at para. 148; see also Slattery, 
2006; Grant and Ross, 2006; McNeil, 2006, 1999). 
Embedded in the court's conception of aboriginal title is the notion that pre-existing 
systems of indigenous governance form the basis of an aboriginal right to jurisdictional 
control of land, a principle later characterized by the Supreme Court of BC in Campbell et al. 
v. AG BC/AG Cda & Nisga'a Nation et al. ("Campbell2000) as "governmental" in nature 
(at para. 114; see also McNeil, 2006). Chief Justice Lamer cautioned, however, that 
"[exclusivity is a common law principle derived from the notion of fee simple ownership 
and should be imported into the concept of aboriginal title with caution" [...and that...] 
"consideration of the aboriginal perspective may also lead to the conclusion that trespass by 
other aboriginal groups does not undermine, and that presence of those groups by permission 
may reinforce, the exclusive occupation of the aboriginal group asserting title" (at paras. 156-
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157; see also Grant and Ross, 2006; Slattery, 2006; McNeil, 2006). 
In making a determination of exclusivity, Delgamuukw (1997) affirmed that courts 
must "be sensitive to the realities of aboriginal society" and "rely on both the perspective of 
the common law and the aboriginal perspective, placing equal weight on each" (at para 156). 
The Court also found it "important to note that that exclusive occupation can be 
demonstrated even if other aboriginal groups were present, or frequented the claimed lands. 
Under such circumstances, exclusivity would be demonstrated by 'the intention and capacity 
to retain exclusive control'" (at para. 156, quoting McNeil, 1989). 
"Shared exclusivity" 
Reliance on the criterion of exclusivity, then, does not preclude a finding of "shared 
exclusivity" or joint aboriginal title, at least in theory. In fact the court in Delgamuukw 
(1997) addressed the issue of overlapping claims directly, saying that the 
"requirement of exclusive occupancy and the possibility of joint title can be 
reconciled by recognizing that joint title can arise from shared exclusivity. As well, 
shared, non-exclusive aboriginal rights short of aboriginal title but tied to the land and 
permitting a number of uses can be established if exclusivity cannot be proved (at p. 
11, emphasis added; see also at paras. 155-158, Grant and Ross, 2006; Slattery, 2000). 
Exclusivity, then, may derive from an ability to exclude others. Shared exclusivity 
means the ability to exclude others except for those with whom prior occupation is shared (at 
para. 158). Especially important here is the characterization of shared, non-exclusive rights 
"short of aboriginal title," implying that courts may prefer to characterize spatially 
overlapping aboriginal rights as site- and resource-specific (as opposed to jurisdictional) 
where exclusivity is not established. 
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Justice La Forest (in separate but concurring reasons) would have preferred the 
judgment in Delgamuukw (1997) go further in clarifying distinctions of exclusivity. 
According to La Forest, it may be appropriate for the court to determine joint or shared 
aboriginal title where "one aboriginal group may have ceded its possession to subsequent 
occupants or merged its territory with that of another aboriginal society" (at para. 198). If 
this is true then what emerges as important (in the view of the court) is the timing of 
geopolitical events, and whether occupation was exclusive at the time of Crown sovereignty 
rather than at some point in time prior to the assertion of Crown sovereignty. Because the 
claim in Delgamuukw (1997) was not subject to overlapping claims of other indigenous 
groups, the majority choose not to engage in detail with the implications of such joint title, or 
how reconciliation of joint title and/or overlapping rights might be actualized (at para. 158). 
Overlapping rights and the axes of time and geographic scale 
Examination of the Delgamuukw (1997) decision exposes two important 
considerations salient to the issue of overlapping and contested claims, both related to the 
axes of time and geographic scale. The first concerns the concept of "shared exclusivity," 
which while not thoroughly explicated by the court, certainly left open the possibility of such 
a finding. As suggested by Justice La Forest, criteria important for distinguishing between 
exclusive and "shared exclusive" aboriginal title are the pre-colonial geopolitics of each 
instance and the timing of events. While the Supreme Court of Canada has yet to engage 
directly with competing claims for aboriginal title, the preceding discussion suggests that 
there may be instances where two indigenous groups may have valid claim for aboriginal title 
in the same area, where both group's claims derive from exclusive prior occupation (or 
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control) at different times prior to Crown sovereignty.11 
A second important consideration flows from the courts' conception of aboriginal 
rights as occurring along a spectrum in relation to their degree of connection to land. At one 
end of this spectrum rights may be a specific and "free-standing" (such as fishing) which 
may or may not be tied to specific sites. At the other end there is the right of aboriginal title, 
a right to the land itself (Delgamuukw, 1997, at para. 138). Differing forms of rights 
occurring along this spectrum invoke different spatialities, be they site- and/or resource-
specific, or broader rights of territorial jurisdiction. Aboriginal rights may be exclusive or 
non-exclusive, where the rights of one group may derive from exclusive occupation (or 
control) of land, while the rights of another group may derive from non-exclusive practices 
such as the exploitation of a particular resource (Slattery, 2000). 
Added to this complexity is the courts' determination of different "threshold dates" 
for different kinds of rights. In R v. VanderPeet (1996) (following R. v. Sparrow, 1990), 
for example, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a specific aboriginal right is a "practice, 
custom or tradition integral to the distinctive culture" (at para. 45) of an indigenous group 
"that existed prior to contact with European society" (at p. 4-5, para. 45, emphasis added). In 
Delgamuukw (1997) it was held that the salient date for establishing the right of aboriginal 
title is the date immediately prior to Crown sovereignty (at para. 145, emphasis added). 
Considering the transformation of indigenous societies that occurred between these dates, 
this distinction may also give rise to overlapping rights and claims, where for example an 
indigenous group may have gained territorial control from another group in the intervening 
years (Slattery, 2000).12 
" See Waldron (2003) for a thoughtful discussion of "prior" and "original" occupation. 
12 The discrepancy between "threshold dates" may also give rise to instances where an indigenous group is not able to 
legally establish a specific right such as hunting (being based on a indigenous practice extant prior to the date of 
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Indigenous territorial identity and Tsilhqot'in Nation v. British Columbia (2008) 
The BC Supreme Court action in Tsilhqot'in Nation v. British Columbia ("Tsilhqot'in 
Nation 2008) was brought on behalf of all members of the Xeni Gwet'in First Nations 
Government and all the members of the Tsilhqot'in Nation. An initial claim sought an 
injunction to prevent the Crown from harvesting of timber in the claim area, an area totaling 
about 4,500 square kilometers in the Cariboo-Chilcotin region of British Columbia (at para. 
62; see also Newman and Schweitzer, 2008). A subsequent claim of the same plaintiff 
sought a declaration of Tsilhqot'in aboriginal title to the same area. These two claims were 
consolidated in 2002 as Tsilhqot'in Nation (2008). 
The ruling in Tsilhqot'in Nation (2008) has a significance that goes beyond the usual 
for a judgment emanating from a trial court. While no declaration of aboriginal title was 
made for procedural reasons,13 Tsilhqot'in Nation (2008) is the closest any Canadian court 
has come to making a declaration of aboriginal title and will likely have implications for how 
indigenous territorial identity is conceptualized by courts in future cases (McNeil, 2010; 
Newman and Schweitzer, 2008). In addition to affirming the test of proof of aboriginal title 
posited in Delgamuukw (1997), the decision Tsilhqot'in Nation (2008) engages with three 
issues important to overlapping and contested claims: 1) the contested spatial dimensions of 
aboriginal rights; 2) overlapping claims and strength of legal claims for aboriginal title; and 
3) the characterization of a "proper rights holder." 
colonial contact) but may be able to prove a right of aboriginal title (being based on exclusive occupation prior to the 
date of British sovereignty) which paradoxically would include specific rights such as hunting (Slattery, 2000). See 
also especially Marsden and Galois (1995) for a thoughtful discussion of "fur trade era" geopolitical transformation in 
the northwest coast of British Columbia. 
13 Because the plaintiff had initially framed pleadings as an "all or nothing" claim, the court declined to make a 
declaration of aboriginal title to any of the claim area. Instead, Justice Vickers offered his obiter opinion that 
aboriginal title does exist in a portion of the claim area (at para. 794), and that the actions of the provincial 
government have in fact unjustifiably infringed upon Tsilhqot'in Aboriginal title and rights. The appeal was heard in 
the British Columbia Court of Appeal in November, 2010. As of this writing, the judgment has not been released. 
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Contested spatial dimensions of aboriginal rights in Tsilhqot'in Nation 
In Tsilhqot'in Nation (2008) the Tsilhqot'in (the plaintiff) argued that "a declaration of 
Aboriginal title, providing a right to exclusive possession and the economic benefits of the 
land, is fundamental to the cultural and economic survival of Tsilhqot'in people as a distinct 
society" (at para. 603). The plaintiffs also argued that "a declaration of Aboriginal rights that 
does not include a declaration of Aboriginal title to the land would be insufficient to ensure 
Tsilhqot'in cultural security and continuity" (at para. 603). 
The federal and provincial governments (the defendants) argued that such a 
"territorial approach" was not supported by the application of law (at para. 604). The 
defendants argued that the evidence "might support a declaration of Aboriginal title to 
smaller sites where specific Aboriginal activities or practices took place," but that these sites 
should be limited to discrete areas within the claimed area (at para. 608). In rejecting the 
defendant's geographically narrow characterization of Tsilhqot'in aboriginal rights, Justice 
Vickers found "no evidence to support a conclusion that Aboriginal people ever lived this 
kind of postage stamp existence" (at para. 610). Justice Vickers was pointed in his reply to 
the arguments of the defendants: 
"What is clear to me is that the impoverished view of Aboriginal title advanced by Canada 
and British Columbia, characterized by the plaintiff as a "postage stamp" approach to title, 
cannot be allowed to pervade and inhibit genuine negotiations. A tract of land is not just a 
hunting blind or a favourite fishing hole. Individual sites such as hunting blinds and fishing 
holes are but a part of the land that has provided "cultural security and continuity" to 
Tsilhqot'in people for better than two centuries" (at para. 1376). 
In Delgamuukw (1997) it was determined that prior occupation may be established by 
"the regular use of definite tracts of land for hunting, fishing or otherwise exploiting its 
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resources" (at para 149). In Tsilhqot'in Nation (2008), it was held that "[a] tract of land is 
intended to describe land over which Indigenous people roamed on a regular basis; land that 
ultimately defined and sustained them as a people" (at para. 1377). Justice Vickers 
characterized the "regular use or occupancy of definite tracts of land" as a "high standard," 
and acknowledged the direction provided in R. v. Marshal; R v. Bernard 
("Marshall/Bernard", 2005): "[t]o say that title flows from occasional entry and use is 
inconsistent with [...] the approach to aboriginal title which this Court has consistently 
maintained" (quoting Marshall/Bernard, 2005, at para. 59). In Tsilhqot'in Nation (2008) this 
"high standard" of "regular use or occupancy" was applied by Justice Vickers to determine 
which areas were subject to exclusive prior occupation and which were not, ultimately 
finding that the Tsilhqot'in had proven aboriginal title to about half of the 4500 square 
kilometers claimed. 
Overlapping claims and aboriginal title 
With respect to overlapping claims, Justice Vickers found that the evidence presented 
at trial 
"demonstrates the obvious. Aboriginal groups had overlapping territories. They were 
constantly pushing the limits of their territories and this often resulted in fighting. These 
conflicts helped define areas that everyone accepted as 'belonging' to a particular Aboriginal 
group" (at para. 937, quotes on "belonging" in original). 
In determining whether the evidence presented at trial demonstrated "a sufficient 
degree of exclusive occupation to support a finding of Aboriginal title," Justice Vickers 
found it necessary to determined whether "Tsilhqot'in people at the time of sovereignty 
assertion exercised effective control of this land [...or whether...] a reasonable inference be 
drawn that Tsilhqot'in people could have excluded others had they chosen to do so" (at para. 
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929). That Justice Vickers excluded areas for which there were overlapping claims (at para. 
938) from the area over which he determined aboriginal tile, combined with the reasoning 
posited in Delgamuukw (1997) (notwithstanding the theoretical possibility of "shared 
exclusivity), suggests that overlapping claims in effect weakens the strength of legal claims 
for aboriginal title. 
Territorial identity and the "proper rights holder" 
Another aspect of the Tsilhqot'in Nation (2008) decision relevant to the issue of 
overlapping claims is the court's characterization of the "proper rights holder" (at paras. 437-
472; see also Newman and Schweitzer, 2008). How the "proper rights holder" is 
conceptualized - that is, which modern indigenous collectives are (in the view of the court) 
appropriate representational bodies for communally-held aboriginal rights - bears 
significantly on how indigenous territorial identity is defined and, by extension, the degree to 
which territorial claims may overlap and be contested. 
In Tsilhqot'in Nation (2008), a declaration of aboriginal title was sought on behalf of 
the members of the Xeni Gwet'in First Nations Government and on behalf of all of the 
members of the Tsilhqot'in Nation. The Crown (the defendants), however, argued that the 
proper rights holder, if rights were established, should be the Xeni Gwet'in First Nations 
government, one of six contemporary Tsilhqot'in Indian Act-defmed Bands (Tsilhqot'in 
Nation, 2008, at para. 427). The defendants supported their position by "referring to the 
evidence that, among the historic community of Tsilhqot'in people, decisions about the uses 
of particular locations were made at the band or encampment level" (at para. 450). In the 
view of Justice Vickers this argument placed too much emphasis on a single, localized 
indigenous decision-making body (at para. 445). Instead, Justice Vickers found that while 
Tsilhqot'in "have experienced shifts in their members' self-identification [...w]hat remains 
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constant are the common threads of language, customs, traditions and a shared history that 
form the central 'self of a Tsilhqot'in person" (at para. 457). According to Justice Vickers, 
"the creation of bands did not alter the true identity of the people. Their true identity lies in 
their Tsilhqot'in lineage, their shared language, customs, traditions and historical experiences. 
While band level organization may have meaning to a Canadian federal bureaucracy, it is 
without any meaning in the resolution of Aboriginal title and rights for Tsilhqot'in people" 
(at para. 469). 
In the view of Justice Vickers, relevant to establishing the "proper rights holder" for 
the purposes of s. 35(1) is the ancestral connection of a modern community to the relevant 
community in existence at the time of colonial contact (for free-standing rights) or Crown 
sovereignty (for aboriginal title) (at para. 445). If a claim of prior exclusive occupancy is 
based on the pre-sovereignty ability of an indigenous group to control access to and use of 
land by others groups (as opposed to physical occupancy), then critical to establishing the 
proper rights holder is a connection of the modern community to the community that 
historically exercised such control (at para. 439). Based on both historic evidence (at paras. 
460-463) and the modern Tsilhqot'in conception of communal identity (at paras. 449, 468), 
Justice Vickers found no meaningful distinction between the rights of Tsilhqot'in people 
represented by the different Indian Act-defined Bands (at para. 449), and determined that 
"the proper rights holder," whether for aboriginal title or aboriginal rights, is the community 
of Tsilhqot'in people (at para. 470). As discussed in more detail later, the seldom addressed 
question of which modern indigenous collectives are the legal holders of rights may have 
implications for policy, if not for the BC treaty process, particularly with respect to how the 
46 
bounds of indigenous territorial identity are defined and delineated.14 
Chapter summary: Overlapping claims and the lens of jurisprudence 
This chapter has engaged with the common law doctrine of aboriginal rights, being a 
sui generis body of inter-societal law derived equally from customary indigenous laws and 
English common law. The goal here has been to scrutinize the territorial dimensions of 
aboriginal rights through the "lens" of Canadian courts, and in particular to examine how 
different conceptions of aboriginal rights are equated with dissimilar conceptions of 
indigenous territoriality. As in the previous chapter, here we see varied conceptions of 
indigenous territorial identity, ranging from site- and resource-specific rights to a more 
spatially broad territorial identity, where differently conceived forms of aboriginal rights 
invoke different forms of boundaries. 
Analysis of the decisions in Delgamuukw (1997) and Tsilhqot'in Nation (2008) 
exposes a set of legal principles that frame how the spatial dimensions of aboriginal rights 
have been characterized by Canadian courts. Common law principles particularly relevant to 
the issue of overlapping and contested claims are summarized below. 
Dissimilar rights give rise to overlapping rights 
Constitutionally entrenched aboriginal rights occur along a spectrum in relation to 
their degree of connection with land (Delgamuukw, 1997, at para 138). At one end of the 
spectrum are aboriginal rights for which proof of prior exclusive occupation may not be 
sufficient to support a claim of aboriginal title, but may be recognized by the courts as 
specific aboriginal rights according to the "integral to a distinctive culture" test (R. v. 
14 For example, the proposed (and now apparently defunct) BC Recognition and Reconciliation Act of 2009 used the 
term "proper rights holder" to emphasize the recognition and "reconstitution" of indigenous Nations, as opposed to 
Indian y4c/-defined bands, and articulated a broad conception of indigenous territorial identity based on large, 
mutually exclusive territories of indigenous nations (First Nations Leadership Council, 2009). 
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Sparrow, 1990, at para. 27; R v. Van der Peet, 1996). At the other end of the spectrum is 
aboriginal title which confers a right to the land itself, including "governmental" authority to 
decide (with limits) to what use the land may be put (Tsilhqot'in Nation, 2008; R. v. Marshal; 
R v. Bernard, 2005; Delgamuukw, 1997; Campbell et al. v. AGBC/AG Canada, 2000). There 
are different spatialities associated with different rights occurring along this spectrum, where 
rights may range in geographic scale from the site-specific to a more broadly conceived 
territorial jurisdiction. Differently conceived aboriginal rights may give rise to overlapping 
rights, and to overlapping claims. 
Prior exclusive occupation 
Aboriginal title is predicated on the prior and exclusive occupation of land by an 
indigenous group immediately prior to the assertion of Crown sovereignty (Tsilhqot'in 
Nation, 2008; R. v. Marshal; R v. Bernard, 2005; Delgamuukw, 1997). Prior and exclusive 
occupation can be established either by proof of prior physical occupation or by establishing 
by reference to customary indigenous law that an indigenous group had the capacity to 
regulate access to and use of lands (Tsilhqot'in Nation, 2008; R. v. Marshal; R v. Bernard, 
2005; Delgamuukw, 1997). What remains unclear is whether, and under what circumstances, 
courts may determine "shared exclusivity" between different indigenous groups, or what 
markers of differentiation courts might apply in determining such a distinction. While the 
courts have theoretically not precluded the possibility of finding that two (or more) groups 
might "share exclusivity," cases rendered to date show that claims to aboriginal title are 
stronger in instances where claims are exclusive to other groups (Tsilhqot'in Nation, 2008; 
Haida Nation v. British Columbia, 2004; R. v. Marshal; R v. Bernard, 2005; Delgamuukw, 
1997). 
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Indigenous territorial identity and the "proper rights holder" 
Where, according to indigenous law and custom, the rights of one indigenous group 
are not privileged over another indigenous group, the legal rights holder is a broader 
indigenous collective linked by ancestral lineage, language, custom, tradition, and shared 
history (Tsilhqot'in Nation, 2007), The term to which the courts ascribe this conception of 
communal identity is "Nation" (Tsilhqot'in Nation, 2008; Delgamuukw, 1997). Through its 
governmental authority, an indigenous Nation may decide to reconfigure the organization of 
its communal identity and institutions of governance (Tsilhqot'in Nation, 2008; Campbell et 
al. v. AGBC/AG Canada, 2000; see also McNeil, 2006). The division of indigenous people 
into Indian Act-defined Bands was not an act of indigenous governmental authority, and 
therefore Indian Act-defined Bands may not be recognized by the courts as a "proper rights 
holder." The reasoning applied in Tsilhqot'in Nation (2008) suggests that in instances where 
shared aboriginal title is claimed on the basis of "shared exclusivity," courts may be inclined 
to find a single aboriginal title ascribed to a broader indigenous territorial identity, 
particularly where the societal "threads of language, customs, traditions and a shared history" 
are common to both groups making the claim (Tsilhqot'in Nation, 2008, at para. 457). As 
shown in the next chapter, how indigenous communal identity is conceptualized has a 
profound effect on how claims are spatially defined, and goes directly to questions of 
exclusivity, and exclusivity to whom? 
Consultation and overlapping claims 
Aboriginal rights are not absolute, and may be infringed upon by the Crown provided 
such infringement is justifiable (R. v. Sparrow, 1990, at para 6; see also for example 
Delgamuukw, 1997; Haida Nation v. British Columbia, 2004; R. v. Van der Peet, 1996; R. v. 
Gladstone, 1996). The infringement of aboriginal rights may be partly or fully justified by 
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consulting with and, under some circumstances, accommodating, indigenous groups whose 
rights may be impacted by the actions of the Crown (Borrows and Rotman, 2007; McNeil, 
2005; Christie, 2006; Lawrence and Macklem, 2000). The burden of justification extends to 
instances where there is a prima facia reasonable expectation that aboriginal rights may exist 
(Haida Nation v. British Columbia, 2004). As discussed in the next chapter, the Crown's 
duty to consult and accommodate is relevant to the issue of overlapping claims where there is 
a reasonable expectation that the settlement of a treaty (an action of the Crown) might impact 
or prejudice the aboriginal rights of indigenous groups not party to a treaty. 
"The aboriginal perspective " 
Courts are required to consider "the aboriginal perspective" when conceptualizing the 
nature and form of aboriginal rights (R. v. Sparrow, 1990, at p. 39; see also Tsilhqot'in 
Nation, 2008; Haida Nation v. British Columbia, 2004; R. v. Marshal; R v. Bernard, 2005; 
Delgamuukw, 1997). The indigenous perspective is particularly relevant to how indigenous 
territorial identity is conceptualized, where rights to land and resources occur across a range 
of geographic scales from the site-specific to a more broadly conceived territoriality. Within 
the case law reviewed there appears to be some disagreement between Justices with respect 
to the task of the court in this regard. Some have characterized the role of the Courts as one 
of "translating" pre-contact or pre-sovereignty indigenous practices to a corresponding legal 
right known in English common law, while others argue that "the aboriginal perspective" 
must be considered independently and given equal weight (see for example the majority and 
dissenting opinions in R. v. Marshal; R v. Bernard, 2005, see also Slattery, 2006; Borrows, 
2005). 
Such contestations reflect a friction at the heart of the courts' conceptualization of the 
spatial dimensions of aboriginal rights, and the challenge of simultaneously addressing the 
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goals of both recognition and reconciliation (Slattery, 2006, Penikett, 2006; Woolford, 2005). 
As in the BC treaty process, such principals do not sit well together, where principles of 
recognition necessitate consideration of "the aboriginal perspective" when determining the 
nature and scope of legal rights, and where the edict of reconciliation requires that "the 
aboriginal perspective" be cognizable to the court, as well as reconcilable with the interests 
of broader society. Aboriginal rights and their spatial dimensions are thus not strictly 
indigenous products, but rather derive from a nexus of laws in which both the traditional and 
the modern are represented, "negotiated" and often transformed. 
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CHAPTER 4: CAUSES AND IMPLICATIONS OF OVERLAPPING AND 
CONTESTED CLAIMS 
In 1973 Canada announced it would negotiate modern treaties with indigenous groups 
"where their traditional interest in the lands concerned can be established" (Canada, 1973 as 
cited in Usher, 2003, p. 374; see also Freeman, 2011; Hurley, 2009; Scholtz, 2006). A 
requirement for clarity of indigenous jurisdiction was later underscored in Canada's 
Comprehensive Land Claims Policy of 1986, which stated that "where more than one 
claimant group utilizes common areas of land and resources, and the claimants cannot agree 
on boundaries, resource access or land-sharing arrangements, no lands will be granted to any 
group in the contested area until the dispute is resolved" (Canada, 1986, p. 12). A similar 
policy was adopted by the government of British Columbia, which stated that it "will not 
support a treaty settlement package where overlaps exist" (British Columbia, 1996, as cited 
in de Costa, 2002, p. 225). Until recently the incentive to address overlapping and contested 
indigenous claims was compelling: the federal and provincial governments would not settle 
treaties in contested areas. 
In British Columbia the federal policy requiring "traditional interest in lands [...] be 
established" has not been implemented and the policy of not "granting" land in contested 
areas appears to have been ignored entirely. All of the modern treaties settled in British 
Columbia to date have been subject to overlapping and contested claims. Such an approach 
to treaty making might lead one to conclude that the issue of overlapping and contested 
claims is not really a problem in the context of the BC treaty process, or at least not 
sufficiently problematic to warrant delaying treaty settlement until contested territorial claims 
are addressed. Certainly there are some who argue that overlapping claims are simply a 
product of indigenous groups having historically shared territories and that modern treaty 
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agreements contain adequate provisions to safeguard the aboriginal rights of indigenous 
groups with overlapping claims (Arvey, 2007). 
It is the conclusion of this thesis that the issue of overlapping claims is indeed 
problematic in the context of treaty negotiation in British Columbia, and that the Crown is 
implicated in the issue by default or design. The goal of this chapter is to make this case: to 
illustrate by example an understanding of the causes and implications of overlapping claims, 
and in doing so underscore the problematic nature of the issue. In the paragraphs that follow 
I argue that insufficient engagement of the Crown and the BC Supreme Court in the issue has 
combined to provide a powerful disincentive for some indigenous groups to reconcile 
territorial claims with their indigenous neighbours, and that the settlement of treaties in 
contested areas does indeed prejudice the rights of indigenous groups with overlapping 
claims. 
Section 1: Examples and Causes of Overlapping and Contested Claims 
The BC treaty process 
A primary motivation of treaty negotiation in British Columbia is to achieve certainty 
(BCTC, 201 la; Penikett, 2006; Woolford, 2005). "Certainty" in this context means that 
"first and foremost, conflicts between Aboriginal and Crown title be resolved so that there is 
clarity with regard to who owns and has jurisdiction over lands in British Columbia" 
(Woolford, 2005; p. 2). In 1990 a task force comprised of representatives from leading 
indigenous groups and the provincial and federal governments was mandated to identify a 
way to achieve certainty through the reconciliation of Crown sovereignty with aboriginal 
rights (McKee, 2009; Penikett, 2006; Woolford, 2005). In 1992 the First Nations Summit 
(representing roughly 135 of 197 Indian ^ctf-defined Bands in British Columbia), the 
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government of British Columbia, and the government of Canada formally adopted all 19 of 
the Task Force's recommendations (BC Claims Task Force, 1991). In 1992 the BC treaty 
commission was established to act as the neutral facilitator of the BC treaty process (BC 
Treaty Commission Act, 1995; BC Treaty Commission Agreement, 1992). 
Two task force recommendations are of primary relevance to the issue of overlapping 
and contested claims. After almost twenty years of negotiation the policy of the parties to the 
BC treaty process remains consistent with Task Force recommendations 7 and 8: that "the 
organization of First Nations for the negotiations is a decision be made by each First Nation" 
and that indigenous groups are to "resolve issues related to overlapping traditional territories 
among themselves" (BC Claims Task Force, 1991, p. 19-20). There are now 59 different 
indigenous groups participating in 50 separate negotiations in the BC treaty process, close to 
three times as many as had been initially expected by the provincial and federal governments 
(BCTC, 201 lb, 2010b, 2001, 1996). A third of British Columbia's aboriginal population is 
not represented in the BC treaty process (Canada, 201 la). The issue of overlapping claims 
involves most indigenous groups in the province, including those that have chosen not to 
participate in the BC treaty process (BCTC, 2010a, 2010b). 
Territorial identity and statements of intent 
Indigenous groups wishing to negotiate a treaty in British Columbia are required to 
submit to the BC treaty commission a "statement of intent" that describes, among other 
things, the organizational body representing the "claimant" group and the "general 
geographic area of the First Nation's traditional territory" (BC Treaty Commission 
Agreement, 1992, p. 4). The "traditional territories" of indigenous groups that have filed 
statements of intent with the commission as of January, 2010, are shown on Map 1 (BC 
ILMB, 2010). It is apparent from Map 1 that the asserted territories of indigenous groups 
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participating in the BC treaty process are not the mutually exclusive areas typical of 
ethnographic area maps but rather represent numerous overlapping claimed areas, and areas 
of blank space that silently confer the territories of indigenous groups not participating in the 
BC treaty process. 
Consistent with the recommendations of the BC Claims Task Force (1991), the 
authority of the BC treaty commission is, among other things, to "receive" statements of 
intent, not to make determinations of their authenticity (BCTC, 2010b; BC Treaty 
Commission Agreement, 1992, p. 4). The term "traditional territory" is not defined in 
statutes enabling the commission and is only vaguely described in commission policy as the 
"distinct traditional territory that is generally recognized as being their own" (BCTC, 201 lc, 
p. 1). The BC treaty process is not concerned with proof or strength of asserted territorial 
claims, but rather was conceived as an explicitly political alternative to the long and costly 
process of indigenous groups having to prove the scope of their rights in court (McKee, 
2009; Penikett, 2006; Woolford, 2005; Usher, 2003). There is no requirement, in other 
words, for indigenous groups negotiating within the BC treaty process to lay out the factual 
content on which their claims to territory are based. 
Expressions of indigenous territory submitted to the commission are "received" as 
presumptive territorial claims with the expectation that indigenous groups will "resolve 
issues related to overlapping traditional territories among themselves" (BC Claims Task 
Force, 1991, p. 20). If we accept that this expectation requires that indigenous groups be 
motivated and able to "resolve" overlapping claims among themselves, it follows that the 
Crown would provide some incentive to do so, or at least not tacitly discourage such efforts. 
The examples and discussion that follows suggest that this expectation may have been 
wishful thinking, particularly inasmuch as the Crown and the BC Supreme Court have 
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subsequently provided a powerful disincentive for some indigenous groups to reconcile 
contested territorial claims with their indigenous neighbours. 
The "Nass Area": An example of "inter-national" overlapping and contested 
claims 
The Nisga'a were the first indigenous group to finalize a modern treaty in British 
Columbia, an agreement that "exhaustively sets out Nisga'a section 35 rights [and] the 
geographic extent of those rights" (Nisga'a Final Agreement, 1999, p. 20). In doing so the 
Nisga'a treaty crystallized one of the most well-known instances of contested claims, one 
that has been vociferously contested in the media (Mickleburgh, 1999; Rinehart, 1999; 
Fouraier, 1998), before the Senate Committee on Aboriginal Affairs (Canada, 1999), and in 
the BC Supreme Court {Gitanyow First Nation v. Canada, 1999; Luuxhon et al. v. HMTQ 
Canada et al. and Nisga'a Nation,1998). 
Five indigenous groups claim territory in the Nass River watershed: the Tahltan, 
Gitksan, Gitanyow, Tsimshian, and Nisga'a peoples. While the Nisga'a treaty was negotiated 
within Canada's Comprehensive Claims process (i.e., was not subject to the policies of the 
BC treaty process), the Tsimshian, Gitksan and Gitanyow are all currently participating in the 
BC treaty process, and lessons learned (and not learned) from overlapping and contested 
claims in this example have significant implications for future treaty making in British 
Columbia. The focus of this section is on the contested territorial claims of the Gitanyow 
and Nisga'a and of the Gitksan and Nisga'a.15 
Spatial dimensions of rights and benefits conferred by the Nisga'a treaty 
The Nisga'a Final Agreement ("NFA", 1999) confers to the Nisga'a, among other 
15 A memorandum of understanding was reached between the Nisga'a and the Tsimshian concerning boundary 
definition, access to resources and common development activities (Wesley, 2007). See Sterritt et al. (1998) for a 
discussion of the Tahltan claim at the headwaters of the Nass watershed. 
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things, "Nisga'a Land" (in the estate of fee-simple), other fee-simple lands, economic 
opportunities, access to natural resources, and rights of shared decision-making (with the 
provincial government) concerning natural resources over a significant portion of the Nass 
River watershed (NFA, 1999). Land rights and benefits conferred by the Nisga'a treaty and 
the territorial claims of the Tsimshian, Gitksan and Gitanyow (as submitted to the 
Commission) are shown on Map 2, and summarized in table 1, below. 
Table 1. Land rights and benefits conferred by the Nisga'a Final Agreement (1999) and 
overlapping and contested territorial claims in the "Nass Area." 
Nisga'a Nation ownership of "Nisga'a Lands" (in the estate of fee simple) and other fee 
simple parcels in areas also claimed by the Gitanyow, Gitksan and Tsimshian (NFA, 1999, p. 
11,31, appends. A, D); 
Nisga'a Nation ownership of a "Nisga'a Commercial Recreation Tenure," with a guarantee 
that British Columbia will not issue another commercial recreation tenure that conflicts with 
the tenure of the Nisga'a for 27 years, in an area also claimed by the Gitanyow (NFA, 1999, 
p. 46-47, append. E); 
Nisga'a wildlife harvesting and rights of co-management (with the provincial government) 
within the "Nass Wildlife Area," an area encompassing almost the entire area claimed by the 
Gitanyow, and part of which falls within territory claimed by the Tsimshian and Gitksan 
(NFA, 1999, appendix J); 
A provision to record in the British Columbia Geographic Names System Nisga'a language 
place names in territory claimed by the Gitanyow, Gitksan and Tsimshian (NFA, 1999, p. 47 
and appendix F-2); and, 
Nisga'a wildlife and fish harvesting privileges (for some species) over the entire "Nass Area" 
(NFA, 1999, p. 9-10, p. 148 and appendix I). 
Conferral to the Nisga'a of these rights and benefits was, arguably, based on the 
assertion that "the Nisga'a Nation has lived in the Nass Area since time immemorial" (NFA, 
1999, p. 1). According to the Nisga'a Final Agreement (1999, p. 9-10 and p. 148), the term 
"Nass Area" refers to the entire Nass River watershed, as shown on Map 2. 
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Contested claims in the "Nass Area" 
The Nisga'a-Gintanyow instance is an example where a claim to territory (the 
Nisga'a claim) engulfs almost the entire territory claimed by a neighbouring group (the 
Gitanyow). Another striking aspect of this example, though certainly not unique, is the 
degree to which this dispute led to outrage on the part of those involved and even overtures 
of violence (Mickleburgh, 1999; Gitanyow Hereditary Chiefs, 1999). 
The Nisga'a, Gitanyow, Gitksan and Tsimshian form a distinct and closely related 
group sharing many commonalities of culture, society, and language (Halpin and Seguin, 
1990). While there are some cultural differences among these groups, they share a 
customary (i.e., pre-colonial) legal system that defines ownership of territory and rights of 
access to land and resources. The "house" (or wilp) is the fundamental political and land­
owning unit of these groups (Napoleon, 2009; Daly, 2005; Overstall, 2005; Marsden, 2002, 
2001; Turner and Jones, 2000; Sterritt et al., 1998; Delgamuukw, 1997\ Weinstein, 1994). 
According to the Gitanyow, "[t]he documentary record clearly states that the 
Gitanyow Houses have and continue to have aboriginal title and rights to the Mid-Nass River 
Watershed in Northwest British Columbia, and no certainty will be achieved in this [the 
Nisga'a] treaty" (Gitanyow Office of Hereditary Chiefs, 1999, p.l; see also Canada, 1999 
statements of the Gitanyow and Gitksan to the Senate Standing Committee of Aboriginal 
Affairs). 
Nisga'a elder and former MLA Frank Calder,16 on the other hand, contends that 
Nisga'a "boundaries are defined by the water that flows down from all the heights of land to 
the valleys below. This is Nisga'a territory: [f]rom mountaintop to mountaintop[,..] 
everything that flows into the Nass" (quoted in Hume, 2000, p. 60). According to Calder, the 
16 Frank Calder is best known for his role in the seminal Supreme Court of Canada case Calder vs. Attorney General 
of British Columbia (1973), a ruling that affirmed the existence of aboriginal title in Canada. 
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troubles with neighbouring groups began when the land began to be understood in terms of 
private property. Prior to the arrival of settlers, says Calder, relationships among indigenous 
groups were not between nations, but between "Houses" and governed by the reciprocal 
obligations of kin and mutually respected rights (Frank Calder as cited in Hume, 2000; see 
also Napoleon, 2009; Daly, 2005; Overstall, 2005; Weinstein, 1994). 
The Gitksan and Gitanyow, for their part, argue that the settlement of the Nisga'a 
treaty breaches indigenous customary law and federal claims policy, and prejudices the 
negotiating position of the Gitanyow and the Giktsan (Sterritt et al., 1998; Sterritt, 1998). 
Indigenous law and orally recorded history in this context derives from the continuing 
tradition of recounting and validating through "potlatch feast" the geopolitical history of a 
groups' ownership of territory, where the institution of the "potlatch" requires the witnessing 
and validation of rights of ownership and tenure (Napoleon, 2009; Daly, 2005; Overstall, 
2005; Marsden, 2002, 2001; Weinstein, 1994).17 
Written by Gitksan and Gitanyow researchers who prepared testimony for the 
Delgamuukw case, Tribal Boundaries of the Nass Watershed (Sterritt et al., 1998) is a 
scholarly challenge to the territorial claims of the Nisga'a, wherein oral history is supported 
by documentary records and presented as proof of Gitanyow and Gitksan ownership of land 
in the mid- and upper Nass River watershed (see Map 2). Sterritt and others (1998) argue 
that valid claim to territory can occur in one of two ways, either by occupying an area after it 
has been abandoned, or by cession through war or formal conferral as reparation for 
transgression or service. Such land-cession on is only valid when recognized through a 
formal and specific ceremony (called xsiixw) and validated by potlatch (Sterritt et al., 1998; 
17 Oral records are called "adawK' (sometimes spelled "adaawk") in the language of the Nisga'a, Gitksan and 
Tsimshian, which provide account of the "historical events of collective political, social, and economic significance, 
such as migration, territorial acquisition, natural disaster, epidemic, war, and significant shifts in political and 
economic power" (Marsden, 2001, p. 102). 
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see also Daly, 2005; Overstall, 2005). 
Sterritt and others (1998) suggest that the Nisga'a claim to what the Gitanyow 
contend is their territory may have arisen because "about half' of the chiefs and members of 
a Gitanyow village (Kitwancool) moved to Nisga'a villages between 1890 and 1910 (Sterritt, 
1998, p 84; see also Canada, 1999). These Gitanyow leaders became members of the Nisga'a 
Land Committee who organized the now famous Nisga'a land claim petition of 1908, 
submitted to the British Privy Council, which included the Gitanyow and their claimed 
territory (Sterritt et al., 1998). The political alliance between the Gitanyow and Nisga'a was 
short lived, however, as the Gitanyow made a separate claim to the McKenna-McBride 
Commission18 in 1915 and have since pursued their land claims independently (Sterritt et al. 
1998; Sterritt, 1998). 
A possible cause of contested claims in this instance, then, may derive from an 
assumption that Gitanyow-claimed territory was subsumed by the Nisga'a when Gitanyow 
chiefs moved to Nisga'a villages (Sterritt et al. 1998; Sterritt, 1998). According to Sterritt 
and others (1998), however, only in some circumstances (e.g., exogamous marriage) does 
relevant indigenous law permit people to carry title in land with them when they move, and 
then only according to specific protocol (Sterritt et al. 1998; see also Daly, 2005; Overstall, 
2005). According to Sterritt and others (1998), however, there has never been a xsiixw 
ceremony for the transfer of Gitanyow and Gitksan land title to the Nisga'a, and Gitanyow 
chiefs still resident at their ancestral village have continued to assert a separate claim from 
1910 to the present day (Sterritt at al., 1998). 
The Gitanyow and Gitksan contend that the Nisga'a treaty is prejudicial to their 
18 The McKenna-McBride Commission (formally known as the Royal Commission on Indian Affairs for the Province 
of British Columbia) was established in 1912 to resolve the "Indian Reserve question" in British Columbia. In 1916, 
the Commission recommended an exchange of Indian Reserve land that resulted in Indian Reserves occupying land of 
significantly less value (Harris, 2002). 
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aboriginal rights (Canada, 1999; Sterritt et al., 1998, Sterritt, 1998). After repeated attempts 
on the part of the Gitanyow and Gitksan to address the overlap dispute failed (Canada, 1999), 
and prior to the ratification of the Nisga'a treaty, the Gitanyow sought remedy from the BC 
Supreme Court. This case and others related to modern treaties and contested claims are 
discussed later in this chapter. 
The "Lheidli T'enneh Area": An example of "inter- and intra-national" 
overlapping and contested claims 
The Lheidli T'enneh were the first indigenous group to "initial" a modern treaty 
within the framework of the BC treaty process, an agreement that if ratified would "modify 
and continue as modified" the aboriginal rights of the Lheidli T'enneh according to the terms 
of the Lheidli T'enneh Final Agreement (LTFA) (2006, p. 1). If ratified the LTFA would 
confer to the Lheidli T'enneh, among other things, "Lheidli T'enneh Lands" (in the estate of 
fee-simple), "private fee-simple lands," commercial opportunities, rights of resource 
harvesting and shared decision-making (with the provincial government) respecting natural 
resources within the "Lheidli T'enneh Area" (LTFA, 2006). 
Summary of overlapping claims in the "Lheidli T'enneh Area" 
No less that 12 indigenous groups claim aboriginal rights in the "Lheidli T'enneh 
Area," the extent of which is based on the statement of intent boundary of the Lheidli 
T'enneh Band (LTFA, 2006, p. 9; BCTC, 2011b).19 The statement of intent boundaries of 
groups participating in the BC treaty process, assertions of aboriginal rights made by groups 
not participating in the BC treaty process, and the spatial extent of rights and privileges that 
would be conferred by the LTFA are shown on Map 3. Indigenous groups claiming 
19 Estimating the number of "different" indigenous groups asserting aboriginal rights in the Lheidli T'enneh Area is 
imprecise where indigenous groups are organized differently, and where for example a tribal council may represent 
multiple member groups for which only some claim rights in the "Lheidli T'enneh Area." 
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aboriginal rights in the Lheidli T'enneh Area, their cultural group association, and their 
organization in respect the BC treaty process (if any) are listed below: 
Table 2. Overlapping claims and Lheidli T'enneh treaty rights in the "Lheidli T'enneh Area" 
Lheidli T'enneh ownership of "Lheidli T'enneh Lands" (in the estate of fee-simple) and 
"private fee simple lands" (LTFA, 2006, p. 49, append. A) in areas also claimed by: 
Nazko Indian Band and Nakazdli Indian Band. 
Requirement for the government of British Columbia and Lheidli T'enneh to negotiate an 
agreement respecting planning, management, and economic opportunities related to 7 
provincial parks in the Lheidli T'enneh Area (LTFA, 2006, p. 142), including: 
Bowron Lake Park, an area in which rights are also claimed by the Lhtako Dene 
Nation, Xats'ull First Nation and the Tsilhoqot'in Nation; and, 
Kakwa Park, an area in which rights are also claimed by indigenous groups of Treaty 8. 
Provision to establish a Lheidli T'enneh commercial recreation tenure in the Bowron River 
watershed, with a guarantee that the government of British Columbia will not issue a 
conflicting tenure for a fixed term (LTFA, p. 143, append. L) in an area also (partially) 
claimed by: 
Lhtako Dene Nation, Xats'ull First Nation and Tsilhoqot'in Nation. 
Rights of resource harvesting, allocation and shared decision-making respecting wildlife and 
fish within the "Lheidli T'enneh Area" and the "Lheidli T'enneh Fish Area," respectively 
(LTFA, 2006, p. 99, 120-124, append. K), significant portions of which are also claimed by: 
Carrier Sekani Tribal Council (Carrier and Sekani cultural-linguistic groups) 
representing eight indigenous groups in the BC treaty process (not all of which may 
claim aboriginal rights within the "Lheidli T'enneh Area," but one of which, the 
Nakazdli Band, has asserted rights outside the BC treaty process that extend beyond 
the statement of intent of the Carrier Sekani tribal council); 
Northern Shuswap Treaty Society (northern Secwepemc cultural-linguistic group) 
representing four groups in the BC treaty process (not all or which may claim 
aboriginal rights within the "Lheidli T'enneh Area," but two of which, the Canim 
Lake Indian Band and Xats'ull First Nation, claim rights extending beyond the 
statement of intent of the Northern Shuswap Treaty Society); 
Nazko Indian Band (southern Carrier cultural-linguistic group), participating in the BC 
treaty process independently; 
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McLeod Lake Indian Band (Sekani cultural-linguistic group), participating in the BC 
treaty process independently (also "adhered" to Treaty 8); 
Treaty 8 Tribal Association (Cree and Dunne-Za cultural-linguistic groups), 
representing eight indigenous groups, six of which claim rights in the "Lheidli 
T'enneh Area; 
Lhtako Dene Nation (southern Carrier cultural-linguistic group), not participating in 
the BC treaty process; 
Simpcw First Nation (Secwepemc cultural-linguistic group), not participating in the 
BC treaty process; and, 
Shuswap Indian Band (Secwepemc cultural-linguistic group), not participating in the 
BC treaty process. 
Causes of overlapping claims 
Contested discourses of aboriginal rights and their spatial dimensions 
The Lheidli T'enneh are of the central Carrier (Dakelh) cultural-linguistic sub-group, 
whose traditional systems of territoriality and tenure were/are based on the concept of "keyoh" 
(or "keyah" in western Dekelh dialects). A keyoh is a territory "belonging" to an extended 
family or clan (Larsen, 2006; Brown, 2002; Furniss, 1995). The central institution through 
which keyoh were/are "owned" and managed was the potlatch, or "bahlats." The keyoh and 
bahlats together are a customary system of indigenous territoriality and governance that in 
some instances is still known and actively managed/practiced to this day (see for example 
Keyoh Huwunline, 2011; Brown, 2002). 
As throughout the province, the colonial encounter brought considerable change to 
traditional Carrier systems of territoriality and governance (Larsen, 2006; Windsor and 
McVey, 2005; Brown, 2002; see also Harris, 2004, 2002). The division of keyoh territories 
into registered trapping areas in the 1920s and 1930s in particular diluted the authority of 
customary systems by conferring exclusive property rights to individual trap line owners 
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regardless of rank in the bahlats system (Brown, 2002, see also for example Larsen, 2006; 
Harris, 2004). Traumatic events such as epidemics, intentional flooding, and forced 
relocation and acculturation, including the legal prohibition of the bahlats system, had a 
profoundly dislocating effect on Carrier society, where customary systems of organization 
and territoriality sometimes "blurred" as communities were fractured and reorganized to 
accommodate such disasters (Larsen, 2006; Windsor and McVey, 2005; Brown, 2002). 
Contemporary indigenous territorial identities are not strictly indigenous products, but 
rather are outcomes of such "negotiations" in which both the "customary" and the 
"contemporary" are represented, contested and sometimes transformed (Thom, 2009; Egan, 
2008; Larsen, 2006). Such socio-spatial identities are often products of interaction between 
customary identification and colonial dislocation, where territoriality may be enacted as a 
flexible political strategy within and beyond the BC treaty process (Thom, 2009; Larsen, 
2006). While the boundaries of the Gitksan and Gitanyow shown on Map 2 are said to 
reflect an explicitly pre-colonial form of territoriality (Daly, 2005; Overstall, 2005; Sterritt et 
al. 1998), territories converging on the "Lheidli T'enneh Area" (Map 3) are more likely a 
reflection of such "negotiations," where indigenous groups have politicized their connections 
with land as a strategy for legitimizing and actualizing claims. 
The related issue of how indigenous groups are politically organized within and 
beyond the BC treaty process is equally complex, often involving an interplay between 
customary forms of territorial identities (for example, "keyoh," "wilp"clan," "tribe," and 
"nation") and the externally imposed Indian Act-defined Band Council system. Crosscutting 
these may also be varied forms of modern political agency representing the interests of 
multiple indigenous groups within (and beyond) the BC treaty process, such as tribal councils 
and treaty societies (BCTC, 201 lb; Thom, 2010). Some groups negotiating within the BC 
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treaty process, like the Lheidli T'enneh, have distinguished themselves (in their statements of 
intent) as Indian Act-defined Bands. Others are said to be formed in accordance with 
indigenous customary law, while still others are political alliances of multiple groups that 
sometimes crosscut linguistic or other cultural boundaries (BCTC 2011b; Thom, 2010, 2009). 
The spatial dimensions of these identities are not easily defined spaces but rather are, 
to use Lefebvrevian terminology (discussed in Chapter 2), representational spaces that 
simultaneously reproduce hegemonic order (through, for example, the spatial practice of 
representing territory as discretely bounded space) while at the same time serving as a 
medium for contestation and resistance (Lefebvre, 1991; see also Larsen, 2006; Delaney, 
2004). Ancestral connections between people and place are employed as a legitimating 
discourse of claims making, where the spatial practice of map-drawing itself can be 
understood as both a cause of overlapping claims and a site of contestation between different 
ways of knowing land and kin-based relations (Thom, 2009). Here again the role of space is 
central, where preference for exclusivity (e.g., a "resolution" to the overlap "problem") 
reproduces the hegemonic order of mutually exclusive property, and where overlapping 
claims can in one sense be understood as a challenge to the taken-for-granted spatial practice 
of representing territories as mutually exclusive and discretely bounded (Lefebvre, 1991; see 
also Larsen, 2006; Delaney, 2004). 
The flexibility of such socio-spatial identities is particularly evident where indigenous 
groups exhibit dissimilar spatialities in different contexts, as in the "Lheidli T'enneh Area" 
where for example the Nakazdli Indian Band, the Xats'ull First Nation, and Lhtako Dene 
Nation have, in land management processes outside of the BC treaty process, made spatial 
assertions of aboriginal rights substantively larger than the extent of their claims within the 
BC treaty process (see Map 3). For some groups at least, it appears that territory may be 
65 
shaped to fit the purpose for which it is enacted. 
Overlapping claims and the axes of law and time 
One key source of tension among such boundary-meanings is between what 1 will call 
here "aboriginal title community" and "residential community,"20 where each invokes 
different allegiances, legitimating discourses, and representations of space. An "aboriginal 
title community" is a broad conception of territorial identity ascribed to what the BC 
Supreme Court in Tsilhqot'in Nation (2008) calls a "proper rights holder" (at paras. 437-472), 
an identity derived from "common threads of language, custom, traditions and a shared 
history" (at para. 457). To use the framework suggested by de Vos (1975) (discussed in 
Chapter 2), emphasis here is on a past-familial-cultural allegiance, where historical 
antecedent and indigenous law are a dominant discourses for legitimating claims (Knight, 
1982; de Vos, 1975, see also Larsen, 2006; Sparke, 1998). 
At the other end of the conceptual spectrum there may be employed a territorial 
identity predicated on the socio-spatial ambitions of contemporary "residential communities," 
where allegiance is primarily with a present-functional identity derived from present day 
occupation, often based on Indian Act-defined Band membership (Knight, 1982; de Vos, 
1975; see also Thom, 2010,2009). The legitimating discourse here is primarily political 
(although legal discourses of aboriginal rights may also be strategically invoked) and targeted 
to the political actualization of rights. 
A present-functional identity may give rise to the territorialization of specific 
aboriginal rights, based for example on recent and contemporary indigenous occupancy and 
land use. The spatial dimensions of this kind of identity allegiance may be varied as well, 
20 Davies (2003) has applied a similar framework to analysis of overlapping territorial claims in Australia. 
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where territory may encompass a fairly discrete and localized area or, at the other extreme, 
may include infrequent or "far-flung" trips of community members to obtain animals and 
plants, perhaps even with the permission of adjacent indigenous groups (see for example 
Usher, 2003; Tobias, 2000). The spatial dimensions of a past-familial-cultural allegiance (an 
"aboriginal title community") on the other hand, derive from antecedents of a qualitatively 
different order, such as an intimate knowledge of indigenous genealogy and vibrant 
customary systems of territoriality and governance (e.g., "House," or "Keyoh"). 
It would of course be an empirical leap to suggest that indigenous groups that have 
expressed their identity (in their statements of intent) as "nations" or as constituted by 
customary indigenous law would be more likely associated with an "aboriginal title 
community" or have a stronger allegiance with a past-familial-cultural identity. Certainly 
there is an element of hybridity within individual claimant groups, where for example a 
group describes its organization as an "amalgamation, based on traditional law, of the Indian 
Act Band Council for legal and financial purposes and [a customary hereditary organization] 
for cultural and heritage purposes" (BCTC, 201 lb, Allied Tsimshian Tribes of Lax 
Kw'alaams statement of intent). This said, if we accept that claims-making at least to some 
extent requires a historic (that is, pre-colonial) connection between an indigenous group 
making a claim and a specific area, it follows that the way territory is represented flows from 
the manner that such identities are defined. The organization of indigenous groups for 
claims-making purposes defines who "they" are and thus the specific area to which "they" 
are historically and/or contemporarily connected. The expressed territories of contemporary 
"residential communities" are contrasted with the "aboriginal title communities" not because 
one identity is more authentic than the other, but simply because they differ fundamentally in 
the "something else" that boundaries defined. 
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My intent in this project is not to explore in any depth the constitution of such 
identities or to call into question the legitimacy of such expressions. The point to underscore 
here is that each of the expressions of indigenous socio-spatial identity at work within (and 
beyond) the BC treaty process has its own antecedents which overlap across multiple axes of 
difference. It is not just physical boundaries that overlap — it is the criteria used to define 
their meanings and bounds. 
The ghosts of the BC Claims Task Force (1991) 
BC treaty commission policies require that indigenous groups indicate, in their 
statements of intent, the "general geographic area of the First Nation's traditional territory" 
(BC Treaty Commission Agreement, 1992, p. 4). The term "traditional territory" is only 
vaguely defined as the "distinct traditional territory that is generally recognized as being their 
[the claimants] own" (BCTC, 201 lc). When considered in light of long-standing federal and 
provincial policy that treaties would not be settled in areas of overlapping claims, one 
interpretation of the commission's directive on the meaning of "traditional territory" is that 
the intent was for territory to be exclusive to the group making the claim (or at least 
generally recognized as being their own). Exclusivity of claims is consistent with the history 
of treaty making in Canada, where treaties have almost always been made congruously with 
existing treaties - that is, discretely bounded and mutually exclusive (Miller, 2009; Canada, 
2004). Where an indigenous group was not included in a historic treaty, an "adhesion" 
agreement was sought to include omitted indigenous groups instead of a new treaty made in 
an area where a treaty already exists (Miller, 2009). 
Self-defined indigenous organization for treaty purposes has a number of implications 
for the issue of overlapping claims, no least that makes defining who "they" are and the 
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extent of "their" territory difficult, particularly where the organization of indigenous groups 
has and continue to evolve. There are now close to three times the expected numbers of 
indigenous groups participating in the BC treaty process (BCTC, 2009,1996), with a further 
third of British Columbia's indigenous population choosing not to participate. Indigenous 
groups not participating in the BC treaty process are also making territorial claims and, as 
discussed in the second section of this chapter, are contesting the settlement of treaties 
because of overlapping claims.21 
Section conclusion 
The causes of overlapping claims are varied and complex. Different forms of 
indigenous organization in particular reveal a significant cause of overlapping claims as well 
as a wedge into broader contestations over which forms of indigenous organization are most 
appropriate for the assertion and actualization of indigenous rights and interests (Thom, 
2010).22 Without a clear definition of "traditional territory" it is impossible to know the 
meanings that indigenous groups had in mind when they delineated their claims, whether 
based on exclusivity, shared exclusivity, or other markers of distinction such as language, 
historic land use and occupancy, contemporary land use and occupancy, and so on. 
Overlapping claims can be understood as a product of these kinds of varied boundary-
meanings, conceptions that are in some contexts congruent, and in others, incompatible. 
21 For example, the BC Government maintains a "Consultation Areas Database" that houses close to two hundred 
different indigenous boundaries, roughly equivalent to the number of Indian Act-defined Bands in British Columbia. 
Given that roughly 135 Bands are represented in the BC treaty process (as 50 separate negotiations), it follows that 
there may be as many as 62 additional groups (depending on if and how they aggregate) either joining or making 
territorial claims outside of the BC treaty process. 
22 While Canadian courts have yet to hear a case directly on this point, it is certainly conceivably that an "aboriginal 
title community" (based on the legal authority of prior exclusive occupation and the "proper rights holder") might 
contest the political authority of a "residential community" to negotiate the modification of communally held 
aboriginal rights through a treaty (see for example Overstall, 2004; Alfred, 2000). 
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Section 2: The Fallout: Implications of Overlapping and Contested Claims 
The Supreme Court of Canada has stated that the common law doctrine of aboriginal 
rights "provides a solid constitutional base upon which subsequent negotiations can take 
place[,..] that negotiations should also include other aboriginal nations which have a stake in 
the territory claimed [...and that...] the Crown is under a moral, if not a legal, duty to enter 
into and conduct those negotiations in good faith" (Delgamuukw, 1997, at para. 186). In this 
section I argue that modern treaty negotiations in British Columbia have not adequately 
"include[d] other aboriginal nations which have a stake in the territory claimed," and that the 
settlement of treaties in contested areas prejudices the aboriginal rights of indigenous groups 
not party to such negotiations. I argue that the Crown's recent practice of settling treaties in 
contested areas has combined with insufficient judicial engagement on the issue to provide a 
powerful disincentive for some indigenous groups to address overlapping and contested 
claims. Such an approach to treaty-making undermines two principal goals of the BC treaty 
process: to avoid aboriginal rights litigation and to promote certainty of jurisdiction. 
The BC treaty process: "A legal wolf in political clothing" 
The issue of overlapping claims has long been a concern of the BC treaty commission 
(BCTC, 2010a, 2010b, 2009, 1996). This said, the commission has no coercive powers to 
compel indigenous groups to reconcile their contested claims (Arvey, 2007; BCTC, 2010b; 
BC Treaty Commission Act, 1995). Where territorial disputes remain unresolved at latter 
stages of treaty negotiation, the policy of the commission is that it "assess the nature of the 
[overlap] conflict and the efforts made to resolve it, and report its findings to all the First 
Nations parties as well as Canada and BC" (BCTC, 2010b, p. 9). As of June, 2010, the 
commission had not issued such a report, though all of the agreements reached under the 
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auspices of the BC treaty process have been contested because of overlapping claims (BCTC, 
2010b). The commission itself admits that because of "lack of resources" and "lack of 
incentive" the "commission's policies and procedures for reporting on overlapping and 
shared territory disputes have not been widely utilized" (BCTC, 2010b, p. 9). While such 
deviation from policy is regrettable, it should be seen in light of the commission's role in 
respect to the issue. The commission has no authority to compel resolution of overlapping 
claims, but rather is only required to monitor and report to the parties on the issue and may 
engage in meeting facilitation only when requested by First Nations participating in the BC 
treaty process (BCTC, 2010b, 1996). 
The Crown, on the other hand, is profoundly implicated in the issue. Contrary to 
long-standing policy, federal and provincial governments have proven willing to settle 
treaties in contested areas, which not only decreases incentive for First Nations nearing treaty 
settlement to address contested claims but in fact provides a powerful disincentive for some 
groups to do so. The Nisga'a treaty, for example, confers to the Nisga'a both exclusive and 
non-exclusive treaty rights in contested areas. Had the Nisga'a been required to reconcile 
their territorial claims with those of their indigenous neighbours, or submit to binding 
arbitration as the Gitksan and Gitanyow had requested, it is likely that the Nisga'a treaty 
would look quite different than it does today. In particular exclusive fee simple lands in 
areas claimed by Gitksan and Gitanyow may not have been conferred to the Nisga'a, and the 
"Nass Wildlife Area" would likely have been significantly reduced or provisions for shared 
resource allocation and management made part of the Nisga'a treaty (see Map 2). By settling 
the Nisga'a treaty in a contested area the Crown removed what little incentive there was for 
the Nisga'a to reconcile with their indigenous neighbours (Sterritt, 1998; Canada, 1999). 
It is often said that treaty-making in British Columbia is not a legal process, but rather 
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is a forward-looking process for the negotiation of "interests" (Egan, 2008; Penikett, 2006; 
Woolford, 2005; de Costa, 2002). Such an approach is certainly evident in the lack of 
scrutiny given to territorial claims, where self-identified indigenous groups and "their" 
traditional territories are received for negotiation without being questioned. While some may 
choose to characterize treaty-making in British Colombia as an explicitly political process, 
the legal implications of such an approach are particularly profound for groups with 
overlapping claims. The underlying contention of the legal actions brought because of 
contested claims is that modern treaties are conferring treaty rights in areas for which groups 
signing treaties do not have legitimate or exclusive claim, and that settlement of treaties in 
contested areas in effect prejudices the rights of groups with overlapping claims. 
The "overlap cases" 
The Nisga'a treaty and Gitanyow First Nation v. Canada, 1999; Luuxhon v. HMTQ, 1998 
("Luuxhon") 
As discussed earlier, the Nisga'a treaty overlaps with the territorial claims of the 
Gitanyow and Gitksan (see Map 2). After efforts of the Gitanyow, Gitksan, and Nisga'a to 
address contested claims in the "Nass Area" failed, the Gitanyow sought remedy from the 
BC Supreme Court. In the case generally known as "Luuxhon" (Gitanyow First Nation v. 
Canada, 1999; Luuxhon et al. v. HMTQ Canada et al. and Nisga'a Nation, 1998) the 
Gitanyow sought clarification on two questions: are federal and provincial governments 
legally bound to a duty to negotiate with the Gitanyow in good faith and, if so, does the 
negotiation and settlement of the Nisga'a treaty violate such a "good faith" standard by 
failing to adequately account for overlapping claims (Luuxhon, 1999, at paras. 2-3)? 
The court in Luuxhon held that the governments of Canada and British Columbia are 
indeed "obliged to negotiate in good faith with the Gitanyow" (Luuxhon, 1999, at para. 75) 
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but did not rule of the second question. The Crown's appeal was eventually suspended 
(Hurley, 2001). Canadian courts have yet to rule definitively on the question of whether 
negotiating with multiple indigenous groups concerning the same territory can be considered 
"good faith" negotiation, or if the practice of settling treaties in contested areas is consistent 
with the Crown's legal duty to act honorably in its dealings with indigenous peoples. 
The Lheidli T'enneh treaty and Chief Allan Apsassin et aL v. Attorney General (Canada) 
et aL, 2007 ("Apsassin") 
The Lheidli T'enneh Final Agreement (LTFA) was initialed in October, 2006, and 
began a process of community ratification in March, 2007 (BCTC, 2007). As shown on Map 
3, the "Lheidli T'enneh Area" overlaps with territory covered by Treaty 8, a historic treaty 
entered into by Canada and groups of Cree, Beaver, Slavey, and Chippewayan peoples in 
1899 (Devlin and Thielmann, 2009). In February, 2007, six indigenous groups of Treaty 8 
commenced legal action seeking an injunction to prevent ratification of the Lheidli T'enneh 
treaty. In the BC Supreme Court case general known as "Apsassin" {Chief Allan Apsassin et 
al. v. Attorney General (Canada) et ah, 2007), the plaintiffs argued that 
"... the provisions of the Lheidli T'enneh Final Agreement that confer wildlife and migratory 
bird harvesting, plant gathering, and wildlife and parks management rights to the Lheidli 
T'enneh within the territory of Treaty No. 8 are unconstitutional [...] and are of no force and 
effect [...] until there is adequate consultation and accommodation of the existing Treaty No. 
8 rights of the plaintiffs by Canada and British Columbia" (at para. 17; see also plaintiffs 
amended writ of summons, p. 12). 
The concern of the Treaty 8 group (the plaintiff) was that settlement of the Lheidli 
T'enneh treaty would in effect prejudice the plaintiffs treaty and aboriginal rights. The 
plaintiff argued that rights conferred to the Lheidli T'enneh by the LTFA would increase 
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hunting and gathering pressure in the contested area, and that conferral to the Lheidli 
T'enneh of the right to participate in the wildlife and parks management (while the Treaty 8 
had no such explicit rights) would privilege the Lheidli T'enneh to the detriment of the 
plaintiff treaty 8 groups (Apsassin, 2007, amended writ of summons, p. 8). 
The federal and provincial governments and the Lheidli T'enneh (the defendants) 
argued that Lheidli T'enneh exercise of rights conferred by the LTFA would not conflict with 
Treaty 8 rights, and that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the ratification of the LTFA 
would result in immediate irreparable harm to the plaintiff (.Apsassin, 2007, see also outline 
of the Attorney General of Canada, p. 8). The defendants argued that the plaintiffs claim 
was based on a speculative assumption of long term harm, rather than potential immediate 
harm that might result from the ratification of the Lheidli T'enneh treaty per se. The 
defendants argued that even if the Lheidli T'enneh treaty were to cause long-term harm to the 
plaintiff, the non-derogation clauses contained in the LTFA provide adequate protection to 
the aboriginal and treaty rights of groups with overlapping claims (.Apsassin, 2007, see also 
outline of the Attorney General of Canada). 
Specifically, the defendants argued that if the plaintiffs could prove in court that their 
aboriginal and/or treaty rights are adversely affected by a provision of the LTFA, "those 
provisions would continue to operate and have effect only to the extent that they do not affect 
23 All of the modem treaties reached in British Columbia contain the same so-called "non-derogation clauses": 
"51. Nothing in this Agreement affects, recognizes or provides any rights under section 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 for any aboriginal people other than Lheidli T'enneh. 
52. If a superior court of a province, the Federal Court of Canada or the Supreme Court of Canada finally 
determines that any aboriginal people, other than Lheidli T'enneh, have rights under section 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 that are adversely affected by a provision of this Agreement: 
a. the provision will operate and have effect to the extent that it does not adversely affect those 
rights; and 
b. if the provision cannot operate and have effect in a way that it does not adversely affect those 
rights, the Parties will make best efforts to amend this Agreement to remedy or 
replace the provision" (Nisga'a Final Agreement, 1999, p. 22-23; Lheidli T'enneh Final 
Agreement, 2006, p. 27; Tsawwassen Final Agreement, 2007, p. 29; Maa Nulth Final Agreement, 
2006, p. 10-11). 
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the [proven] rights of the plaintiff, and if the provisions cannot so operate, Canada, BC and 
the Lheidli T'enneh will make best efforts to amend the LTFA" (Apsassin, 2007, outline of 
the Attorney General of Canada, p. 9). 
While the court in Apsassin found it "astonishing that this [the overlap] matter has 
been allowed to come this far without resolution" (at para. 37), it nevertheless dismissed the 
application, holding that the Lheidli T'enneh would suffer greater harm than the Treaty 8 
plaintiff if an injunction were granted to stop ratification of the treaty (at para. 38). The 
underlying action did not proceed as the Lheidli T'enneh community voted not to ratify the 
LTFA in March, 2007 (BCTC, 2007).24 
The Tsawwassen treaty and Cook v. The Minister of Aboriginal Relations and 
Reconciliation, 2007 ("Cook") 
The Tsawwassen First Nation Final Agreement (TFNFA) was initialed in December 
2006. The traditional territory identified in the Tsawwassen First Nation's statement of intent 
became the "Tsawwassen Territory" under the Tsawwassen treaty (BCTC, 201 lb; TFNFA, 
2006, p. 19). The "Tsawwassen Territory" overlaps with the claimed territories of over fifty 
different indigenous groups {Cook, 2007, affidavit of Tsawwassen chief Kim Baird) 
including the Semiahmoo, located near White Rock, and the Tsawout, Tsartlip and 
Pauquachin, located on southern Vancouver Island {Cook, 2007). The Tsawout, Tsartlip and 
the Pauquachin are parties to a historic "Douglas Treaty" of the 1850s, in which the Crown 
promised, in part, that they could continue "to hunt and fish as formerly" {Cook, 2007\ see 
also Devlin and Thielmann, 2009). These four groups (collectively the "Sencot'en") are not 
participating in the BC treaty process. 
24 A second legal action seeking an injunction to block the ratification of the Lheidli T'enneh treaty was initiated by 
the Secwepemc Nation but, like the Apsassin case, was later suspended when the Lheidli T'enneh community chose 
not to ratify the treaty (Chief Keith Mathew and others v. HMTQ and others, 2007; see also Map 3). 
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In July, 2007, prior to the initialing of the TFNFA, the Sencot'en brought the BC 
Supreme Court case known as "Cook" (Cook v. The Minister of Aboriginal Relations and 
Reconciliation, 2007), which sought to prevent the provincial Minister of Aboriginal 
Relations and Reconciliation from initialing the Tsawwassen treaty until the provincial 
government had meaningfully consulted with the Sencot'en regarding the potential impact of 
the Tsawwassen treaty on Sencot'en aboriginal and treaty rights (Cook, 2007, at paras. 3 and 
12). The Sencot'en (the petitioners) relied on the legal doctrine of the duty to consult 
established in Sparrow (1990) and later elaborated on in cases such as Delgamuukw (1997) 
and Haida Nation (2004). As was discussed in chapter 3, Haida Nation (2004) held that the 
Crown is required to consult with and, in some circumstances, accommodate indigenous 
groups, where the government has "knowledge, real or constructive, of the potential 
existence of Aboriginal rights or title and [contemplates] conduct that might adversely affect 
them" (Haida Nation, 2004, at para. 64). 
The crux of the plaintiffs argument was that meaningful consultation on the overlap 
issue should occur prior to settling the TFNFA and that no consultation had occurred. The 
plaintiff argued that settling the treaty "effectively precludes any meaningful consultation as 
the Crown's representatives have effectively decided that there will be no necessity for any 
modification or change to the Tsawwassen Final Agreement..." (Cook, 2007, at para. 124). 
Once initialed, modern treaties negotiated within the framework of the BC treaty process 
allow for only "minor changes" to be made to the treaty documents (TFNFA, 2006, p. 211; 
see also LTFA, 2006; MNFNFA, 2006). 
As in the Apsassin (2007) case, in Cook (2007) the defendant (the provincial 
government) and the interveners (the Tsawwassen and the federal government) argued that 
the plaintiff (the Sencot'en) had failed to make out a case of immediate irreparable harm 
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sufficient to warrant stopping the provincial government from initialing the treaty. The 
defendant (and interveners) based their argument on three suppositions: 1) the TFNFA 
conferred only non-exclusive rights in the contested area that would be compatible with the 
non-exclusive rights of the Sencot'en (at para. 110); 2) "the time to engage in consultations is 
after the First Nations themselves have had an opportunity to try to resolve disputes 
internally, and after a Final Agreement has been initialled thereby ensuring that the 
consultations have utility" (at paras. 87 and 110); and 3) that even if the TFNFA did 
constitute an infringement of Sencot'en rights, the non-derogation clauses contained in the 
TFNFA adequately protect the interests of any and all indigenous groups that have 
overlapping claims (at para. 132). 
I will return to these arguments shortly. At this juncture it will suffice to underscore 
the underlying cause of all of the "overlap cases": the contention that through the BC treaty 
process some indigenous groups are being conferred rights to land for which they do not 
have legitimate or exclusive claim. In Cook (2007), the Sencot'en in particular submitted to 
the court voluminous anthropological and historical studies to support such an argument 
which, as in all other overlap cases, the BC Supreme Court declined to consider for 
procedural reasons (at para. 74). Ultimately the court in Cook (2007) declined to make a 
finding of fact on the strength and scope of Tsawwassen and Sencot'en territorial claims (at 
para. 151) and thus did not reach specific conclusions as to long-term potential impact of the 
Tsawwassen treaty on Sencot'en rights (at para. 52). In doing so the BC Supreme Court 
accepted the arguments of the defendants to find that consultation undertaken after initialing 
the treaty could still be meaningful. While the court allowed that "there may be some 
situations where the alleged infringement and the contemplated terms of a treaty are such that 
the claims of the overlapping group cannot be put off until the treaty is initialed" (at para. 
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192) it was not persuaded that the rights of Sencot'en would be irretrievably harmed by 
ratifying the treaty, "particularly having regard to the non-derogation clauses contained in the 
TFNFA" (at para. 199; see also at para. 186 for the court's emphasis on non-derogation 
clauses). Prior to ratifying a treaty the Crown is only required to provide notice to 
potentially affected indigenous groups, but "deeper consultation" is required prior to a treaty 
being implemented (at paras. 186-187). In addition to the non-derogation clauses, important 
in the court's reasoning was a pragmatic consideration of the Crown: the supposed 
"impossibility of ever concluding a treaty if every overlap had to be concluded before the 
TFNFA was finalized" (at para. 185). 
The Maa Nulth treaty and Tseshaht First Nation v. Huu-ay-aht First Nation, 2007 
("Tseshaht First Nation ") 
Indigenous groups wishing to reach agreement with their indigenous neighbours 
concerning overlapping claims generally try to negotiate one of two types of agreements. 
The first is one that excludes contested areas from treaty areas until overlap issues are 
addressed. The Yukon Umbrella Agreement is an example of a treaty that contains such 
provisions to "sever" contested areas from treaty agreements (Council for Yukon Indians, 
1993; Yukon First Nations Land Claims Settlement Act, 1994). 
A common type of "overlap agreement" in British Columbia are those in which 
indigenous groups with overlapping claims agree to adhere to the terms of a bilateral contract 
respecting, for example, boundary locations and shared use and management of an area (see 
for example Wesley, 2007; Krehbiel, 2004). Under this scenario, and where a treaty is given 
effect over an area covered by such a bilateral overlap agreement, both groups conceivably 
retain their s. 35(1) rights, but one (or more) group's rights are "modified and continue" as 
treaty rights once treaties are settled. In the event that such overlap agreements become part 
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of treaties, modern treaties would contain constitutionally entrenched provisions concerning 
overlapping claims. Where bilateral overlap agreements are not included in the language of a 
treaty, as with all modern treaties in British Columbia, a hierarchy of agreements is 
potentially created from which conflict can result (Devlin and Thielmann, 2009). Such 
conflict gave rise to the BC Supreme Court case generally known as "Tseshaht First Nation " 
(Tseshaht First Nation v. Huu-ay-aht First Nation, 2007) which sought an injunction to 
prevent the ratification of the Maa Nulth First Nations Final Agreement (MNFNFA, 2006). 
In 2000 the Tseshaht and the Huu-ay-aht were represented together within the BC 
treaty process, and negotiated a bilateral overlap agreement respecting the shared use and 
management of an area of overlapping claims (Tseshaht First Nation, 2007, at para. 4). The 
bilateral overlap agreement specified, among other things, that there would be "no contest to 
the interests of the [respective parties] with regard to [treaty] land selection and resource 
management" within their respective territories (at para. 6). In 2001 there was a 
reorganization of indigenous groups for claims-making purposes, during which the Huu-ay-
aht and five other groups formed the Maa-Nulth First Nations (Tseshaht First Nation, 2007, 
at para. 5). The Tseshaht chose not to join the Maa Nulth group. The Maa Nulth treaty was 
reached and began a process of community ratification in 2006. 
In Tseshaht First Nation (2007) the Tseshaht (the petitioners) sought an injunction to 
prevent community ratification of the Maa Nulth treaty on the grounds that the treaty 
contravened the bilateral overlap agreement. The Tseshaht argued that the intent of the 
overlap agreement was to mark a mutually agreed boundary between territories, and that 
subsequent treaties would not prejudice the rights of the respective groups within their 
respective territories (Tseshaht First Nation, 2007, at para. 8). Specifically the Tseshaht 
argued that the Maa Nulth treaty contravened the bilateral overlap agreement because it 
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conferred to the Huu-ay-aht rights respecting wildlife harvesting, shared decision-making 
(with the provincial government) and the option to transform lands within the area covered 
by the overlap agreement into Huu-ay-aht fee simple property (Tseshaht First Nation, 2007, 
at para. 8). 
The court ultimately held that "[t]here is no appreciable harm to the interests of the 
Tseshaht that will occur if the Huu-ay-aht ratification vote proceeds" (at para. 29). In so 
ruling the court accepted the argument of the defendant that in entering into the bilateral 
overlap agreement the Huu-ay-aht did not relinquish its rights within the "Tseshaht area" (as 
specified by the overlap agreement). Decisive in the court's reasoning was its acceptance of 
the defendant's argument that the non-derogation clauses set out in the Maa Nulth treaty 
provided a "complete answer" to the argument that implementation of the Maa Nulth treaty 
would cause infringement of Tseshaht rights (at para. 25). 
Summary of the "overlap cases": Judicial (dis)engagement and "bad faith" 
expectations 
The Supreme Court of Canada has determined that section "35(1) of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, provides a solid constitutional base upon which subsequent negotiations can take 
place, and affords aboriginal peoples constitutional protection against provincial legislative 
power" (Sparrow, 1993, at p. 35). Such negotiations, the court tells us, "should also include 
other aboriginal nations which have a stake in the territory claimed" (Delgamuukw, 1997, at 
para 186). The four "overlap cases" reviewed above demonstrate that the reality has been 
quite the opposite. Treaties have been negotiated without involvement of indigenous groups 
that also "have a stake in" territory covered by treaties, and the protection afforded by s.35(l) 
has not prevented the Crown from exercising its legislative power to settle treaties in 
contested areas. 
80 
In the "overlap cases" the BC Supreme Court has in effect sidestepped the underlying 
question at the root these actions: Does the settlement of a modern treaty prejudice or 
infringe upon the rights of groups with overlapping claims? In each instance the court has 
not made a finding of fact on this question, and has focused instead on short-term potential 
for ratification of treaties to cause immediate and irreparable harm to groups with 
overlapping claims. In doing so the BC Supreme Court appears to have been persuaded by 
the argument that the issue can and should be addressed through political processes and, 
short of this, through litigation based on the supposed "complete answer" of the non-
derogation clauses. In the following paragraphs I argued that the court has done so without 
sufficient regard to the "solid constitutional base" of the doctrine of aboriginal rights by: 1) 
diluting the duty of the Crown to negotiate and consult with indigenous peoples in good 
faith; 2) placing an ethically inappropriate burden on indigenous groups with overlapping 
claims to prove their rights in court; and 3) downplaying the extent to which treaty conferral 
of so-called non-exclusive rights may impact the rights of groups with overlapping claims. 
Too little too late: Denying the duty and ex ante potential of consultation 
Haida Nation (2004) held that the Crown has a duty to consult and at times 
accommodate indigenous groups where it contemplates actions which might impact 
aboriginal rights. Aboriginal rights do not need to be proven in court in order for the 
Crown's duty to consult to be triggered (Haida Nation, 2004, at para. 41). The extent of the 
duty owed by the Crown depends on both the strength of the claim of rights (at paras. 39,44) 
and the seriousness of the potential infringement of rights (Haida Nation, 2004, at para. 72; 
see also Christie, 2006). All that is required to trigger the duty is for the Crown to be aware 
of the potential existence of aboriginal rights, after which the Crown is obliged to inform 
itself of the extent and scope of rights that might be impacted (Haida Nation, 2004, at paras. 
81 
27 and 35). 
In Cook (2007) and Apsassin (2007) the position of the Crown was that the duty to 
consult and accommodate should principally apply after treaties have been settled. This 
argument is based on the contention that the content of treaties and thus the extent of 
potential impacts to the rights of groups with overlapping claims cannot be known until after 
treaties are settled. To accept this argument, however, is to accept that governments are only 
required to engage in consultation after treaties have been settled and only "minor changes" 
may be made to the treaty document - a "catch 22." In weighing the balance of harm 
between potential for infringement of rights and the harm that might result from delaying 
ratification of treaties, the court focused primarily on a strict test for immediate irreparable 
harm, the theoretical "complete answer" of the non-derogation clauses, and the supposed 
"impossibility of ever concluding a treaty if every overlap had to be concluded before the 
agreement was finalized" {Tseshaht First Nation, 2007, at para. 25; Cook, 2007, at para.185). 
With respect to the court, I submit that such reasoning misrepresents the intent of the 
doctrine of consultation and accommodation. The plaintiffs in Cook (2007), for example, 
argued that the government had a duty to accommodate their interests, and that the Crown 
had a duty to consult to determine the scope of rights that might be impacted. As stated in 
Haida Nation (2004), "there is no duty to agree; rather the commitment is to a meaningful 
process of consultation" (at para. 42; see also Prowse, 2009; Christie, 2006). The plaintiffs 
in Cook (2007), Apsassin (2007), and Tseshaht First Nation (2007) argued that meaningful 
consultation requires delaying the settlement of treaties until the scope of potential 
infringements is determined. 
The approach of the court in these cases focused instead on whether initialling the 
treaties would cause immediate irreparable harm to the plaintiffs which 1) conveniently 
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(from the perspective of the Crown and the interveners) sidestepped the underlying cause of 
action, and 2) by relying on the supposed "complete answer" of the non-derogation clauses, 
effectively shifted the onus of proof of rights to indigenous groups seeking redress. 
To delay consultation until "First Nations themselves have had an opportunity to try 
to resolve disputes internally" also misrepresents the Crown's duty to consult, as well as 
assumes that the indigenous parties to the dispute have the means and incentive to reconcile 
their territorial claims. Here again the decision in Haida Nation (2004) is instructive: "the 
ultimate legal responsibility for consultation and accommodation rests with the Crown" (at 
para. 54). There is no legal duty for indigenous groups to consult with each other on 
overlapping claims or any other issue, and the few and apparently inconsistently followed 
policies of the BC treaty commission concerning overlapping claims are only applicable to 
groups participating in the BC treaty process (BCTC, 2010b). Had the plaintiffs in Cook 
(2007) and Apsassin (2007) been participating in the BC treaty process it is certainly 
arguable that the commission's policies would have provided an incentive to reconcile 
territorial claims, as well as treaty-related funding to support such efforts. This said, if we 
accept that the BC treaty process is voluntary, it follows that there is at least a tacit "good 
faith" expectation that groups that choose not to participate will not have their rights 
compromised as a result of their choice. 
The Supreme Court of Canada has provided clear guidance on the Crown's duty to 
consult and accommodate: "consultation that excludes from the outset any form of 
accommodation would be meaningless. The contemplative process is not simply one of 
giving [an indigenous group] an opportunity to blow off steam before the [government] 
proceeds to do what [it] intended to do all along" (Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada, 
2005, at para. 54). While it may be technically correct to say that treaties may be amended to 
83 
accommodate the rights of groups with overlapping claims (Arvey, 2007), such an argument 
does not acknowledge the very low likelihood of this ever happening. Once treaties are 
initialled, only "minor changes" can be made, and such changes almost certainly exclude 
redefining the extent and scope of land rights conferred by a treaty in order to accommodate 
the rights and interests of groups with overlapping claims. Even in the case of the Nisga'a 
treaty, which envelopes almost the entire territory claimed by the Gitanyow (see Map 2), no 
such amendment has been made. 
The supposed "complete answer" of non-derogation clauses: placing the onus ofproof 
where it doesn't belong 
The overlap cases demonstrate the BC Supreme Court's reluctance to disturb the 
terms of a treaty in response to the claims of another indigenous group. Determinative in its 
reasoning is acceptance of the argument that so-called non-derogation clauses provide 
adequate protection to the rights of indigenous groups not party to treaties. Non-derogation 
clauses, however, only allow for consideration of overlapping claims where the aboriginal 
rights of the group seeking redress have been determined by a superior court. Such an 
approach leaves unacknowledged the practical difficulties with turning to the courts for relief 
in such situations, and effectively shifts what is purported to be a political process to one that 
is litigious. 
Indigenous peoples are of course familiar with being in a position of disadvantage. 
Until the mid-1990s, the policy of the provincial government was that the only aboriginal 
rights it was legally required to recognize were those that had been affirmed by courts or 
defined by treaty (Foster, 2002; British Columbia, 1995). The rulings in Delgamuukw (1997) 
and Haida Nation (2004) rejected this position. By relying on non-derogation clauses, the 
BC Supreme Court is essentially telling indigenous groups with overlapping claims the same 
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thing the provincial government was telling them over a decade ago: "prove you rights in 
court if you can, and then prove that your rights are being impacted, and then we'll see if the 
court orders us to accommodate your rights." When put in such stark terms, it is difficult to 
imagine that such an approach is consistent with the notion of "good faith" negotiation and 
the Crown's legal obligation to act honorably in its dealings with indigenous peoples. When 
the legality of such an approach was questioned in Luuxhon (1998, 1999), the BC Supreme 
Court in effect declined to answer. 
Modern treaties are conferring exclusive and non-exclusive rights that are prejudicial to 
the rights of groups with overlapping claims 
Counsel for the First Nations interveners in Apsassirt (2007) and Cook (2007) echoes 
the position of the Crown: "as long as treaties continue to deal with harvesting of resources 
on a non-exclusive basis, then the treaties themselves can overlap and operate perfectly well" 
(Arvey, 2007, p. 14). The underlying presumption here is that modern treaties do not confer 
exclusive rights in areas of contested claims and that treaty conferral of non-exclusive rights 
does not infringe on the aboriginal rights of groups not party to modern treaties. The 
plaintiffs in the four "overlap cases" strongly disagree. The BC Supreme Court, for its part, 
has not ruled on the substance of the question: does the settlement of treaties in contested 
area prejudice the rights of groups with overlapping claims? The conclusion of this thesis is 
that it does. 
Treaty conferral of exclusive rights 
The Nisga'a treaty confers to the Nisga'a exclusive fee simple lands within territory 
claimed by the Gitanyow and Gitksan (see Map 2; Sterritt et al., 1998; NFA, 1999). The 
Lheidli T'enneh treaty if settled would confer to the Lheidli T'enneh exclusive "treaty 
settlement land" (in the estate of fee simple) in an area also claimed by the Nazko Indian 
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Band (see Map 3; LTFA, 2006)25 as well as an option to acquire exclusive "private fee simple 
land" in an area claimed by the Simpcw First Nation and the Northern Shuswap Treaty 
Society (see Map 3; LTFA, 2006). The Maa Nulth treaty confers to the Huu-ay-aht an option 
to transform contested lands into Huu-ay-aht owned exclusive fee simple property in an area 
also claimed by the Tseshaht even though, according to the Tseshaht, a bilateral overlap 
agreement explicitly prohibited such conferral (Tseshaht First Nation, 2007, MNFNFA, 
2006). The Tsawwassen treaty confers to the Tsawwassen exclusive "treaty settlement land" 
(in the estate of fee-simple) and an option to acquire exclusive "private fee-simple land" in 
areas claimed by numerous other indigenous groups, including the petitioners in Cook (Cook, 
2007\ TFAFA, 2006).26 The contention that modern treaties do not confer exclusive treaty 
rights in areas subject to overlapping claims is simply not true. 
Many bilateral overlap agreements have been reached (BCTC 2010b). This said, the 
overlap cases demonstrate that this has not always been the case. It would also be 
inappropriate to conclude that indigenous groups with overlapping claims that have not 
sought judicial intervention do not contest the conferral of such treaty rights. Not every 
indigenous group is in a position to litigate. What is certain is that conferral of exclusive 
rights is prejudicial to the rights of groups with overlapping claims simply by virtue of the 
fact that once land is conferred exclusively to one group it is no longer available to another as 
part of future treaty settlement. 
Treaty conferral of non-exclusive rights 
Modem treaties also confer a plethora of non-exclusive rights and benefits in 
25 The Lheidli T'enneh and Nazko have entered into a bilateral agreement concerning overlapping claims (Krehbiel, 
2004). 
26 According to Tsawwassen Chief Kim Baird, the Tsawwassen have established overlap protocol or reached overlap 
agreements with the majority of their indigenous neighbours (Cook, 2007, affidavit of chief Kim Baird). 
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contested areas. The presumption of the Crown (and the First Nations interveners) in the 
overlap cases is that conferral of such rights does not prejudice the rights of indigenous 
groups with overlapping claims. It is the conclusion of this thesis that conferral of such 
rights may indeed have profound implications for indigenous groups with overlapping claims, 
particularly where two (or more) groups have different visions and objectives for a contested 
area. 
Modem treaties, for example, typically confer to the signatory First Nation a right to 
participate in shared decision-making with the provincial government respecting natural 
resource harvesting, management and planning (NFA, 1999; LTFA, 2006; MNFNFA, 2006; 
TFNFA, 2006). Such shared decision-making typically includes a right for a treaty First 
Nation to provide input on the designation of land use zones in contested areas, such as for 
mining or intensive forest harvesting. Indigenous groups with overlapping claims, on the 
other hand, may have different visions and objectives for the contested area, such as the 
designation of a conservation zone. Under such a scenario, it is not difficult to imagine that 
conflicts may arise, which essentially pit the explicitly defined treaty rights of one group 
against the unproven and largely undefined aboriginal rights of another. 
The Tsawwassen treaty, for example, confers to the Tsawwassen a non-exclusive 
right to harvest crab with few restrictions for the first 11 years of the treaty in the 
"Tsawwassen Fishing Area" (TFNFA, 2006, p. 78; Cook, 2007, plaintiff's petition to the 
court at para. 44). The Tsawwassen Fishing Area encompasses Boundary Bay, an area also 
claimed by the Semiahmoo, one of the petitioners in Cook (2007). The Semiahmoo would 
like to place a moratorium on the crab fishery in Boundary Bay to allow stock to recover 
(Cook, 2007, plaintiffs petition to the court). The Semiahmoo contend that the Tsawwassen 
treaty in effect negates such efforts, in "that work, effort and costs that Semiahmoo will incur 
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will be for the benefit of Tsawwassen as they will have access to the crab resources right up 
to the doorstep of the Semiahmoo Reserve" {Cook, 2007, affidavit of Douglas Cook, at para. 
58). 
Treaty conferral of commercial recreation tenures is another example of supposedly 
non-exclusive treaty rights that would likely impact the rights of groups with overlapping 
claims. The Nisga'a and Lheidli T'enneh treaties, for example, confer (or would confer, in 
the case of the Lheidli T'enneh) commercial recreation tenures in contested areas, with a 
guarantee that no conflicting commercial recreation tenure will be issued for a specified 
period of time (NFA, 1999, LTFA, 2006). Treaty conferral of such benefits effectively 
precludes conferral of similar commercial recreation tenures to groups with overlapping 
claims. 
Modern treaties legally confer non-exclusive rights to increasingly scarce natural 
resources. In the overlap cases the BC Supreme Court has taken a short-term approach to the 
issue and in doing so has downplayed the potential for non-exclusive treaty rights to impact 
the aboriginal rights of groups with overlapping claims. A longer-term view exposes a 
number of serious problems with this approach, not least that such rights may not be 
compatible with the interests and goals of indigenous groups with overlapping claims. The 
conferral of treaty rights in contested areas at best limits treaty settlement options available to 
indigenous groups who come later to their treaty, and at worst, in the event that treaty rights 
of shared decision-making lead to increased resource exploitation (for example wildlife 
harvesting, mining or logging), may significantly prejudice the rights of groups with 
overlapping claims. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
The goal of this thesis has been to further the understanding of the causes and 
implications of overlapping and contested territorial claims in the context of the BC treaty 
process. Three questions were posed in the introductory chapter: 1) Does the Crown's 
practice of negotiating with multiple indigenous groups in areas of contested claims have the 
potential to privilege some indigenous groups to the detriment of others? 2) Does the 
settlement and implementation of treaties in contested areas prejudice the constitutionally 
protected aboriginal rights of indigenous groups that are not party to such treaties? And 3) 
are overlapping and contested claims a barrier to the ethical settlement of treaties, and if so 
what can and should be the role of the Crown and the courts in effecting reconciliation of 
overlapping territorial claims in the context of treaty negotiation in British Columbia? The 
goal of this concluding chapter is to summarize the findings of this project and to identify 
potential areas of research focused on the reconciliation of contested territorial claims. 
Thesis summary 
Conceptual considerations 
Chapter 2 exposed a number of conceptual considerations that have utility for 
understanding the meaning and salience of territory in the context of the BC treaty process. 
Relevant concepts reviewed were the social production of space, the intertwining of law, 
space and social power, and ways that identity, narrative, and law are implicated in the 
production of boundaries across axes of time and geographic scale. Particularly salient to 
this project is the idea that socio-spatial identities are rarely if ever homogeneous and 
mutually exclusive, but rather are dynamic and contested products of the discursive 
landscapes within which they are produced. Territories should not be taken as "natural" or 
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intrinsic to particular groups, but rather are social products formed within social norms and 
discourse. 
Chapter 2 also engaged with "traditional" forms of indigenous territoriality and tenure 
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in (what is now) British Columbia, which were produced in markedly different ways by 
different indigenous societies. Where two-dimensional areal tenure was the norm, such as 
for those groups with rigorously defined system of tenure and explicitly defined boundaries, 
territory ascribed the meanings of proprietorship, jurisdiction and sovereignty. For societies 
that had less strictly defined boundaries for kin and allies, territory reflected a level of social 
organization beyond the family and village, for example the extent of a group's travel and 
ties of kinship, within which different forms of tenure were nested. While it may be 
appropriate to ascribe a broad territorial identity to these latter kinds of groups as well, it is 
clear that the meaning of the term "territory" in this context - the "something else" that 
territory describes - is very different than the strictly defined boundaries enacted by other 
groups. Understanding such complexity comes not through the imposition of the language of 
property, but through an understanding of geopolitical history, indigenous legal orders, and 
the ways that the territorial "signs posts" of each group have evolved over time. A point 
worth underscoring here is that indigenous territory and tenure were/are given meaning by 
indigenous legal orders. Where such systems remain vibrant, they provide a conceptual and 
legal framework for the examination and reconciliation of contested territorial claims. 
Spatial dimensions of aboriginal rights and the "lens" ofjurisprudence 
Treaties fall within the legal meaning of s. 35(1) of the Constitution of Canada and 
are compelled and shaped by the common law doctrine of aboriginal rights. Salient to the 
issue of overlapping rights and claims is the court's conception of aboriginal rights as 
occurring along a spectrum in relation to their degree of connection with land. There are 
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different spatialities associated with different aboriginal rights, where rights may range in 
geographic scale from resource- and site-specific to more broadly conceived territorial 
jurisdiction. There is disagreement between some Supreme Court justices with respect to the 
task of the court in determining the nature and scope of aboriginal rights. Such contestations 
reflect a friction at the heart of the court's conceptualization of the spatial dimensions of 
aboriginal rights, and the challenge of simultaneously addressing the goals of both 
recognition and reconciliation. As in the BC treaty process, these goals do not sit well 
together, where the axiom of recognition necessitates consideration of the aboriginal 
perspective when determining the nature and scope of legal rights, but where the edict of 
reconciliation requires that the aboriginal perspective be cognizable to the court, as well as 
reconcilable with the interests of broader society. 
Causes of overlapping and contested claims 
The colonial encounter brought considerable change to indigenous systems of 
territoriality and governance. Traumatic events such as epidemics, displacement and forced 
acculturation, including the legal prohibition of indigenous institutions of governance, had a 
profoundly dislocating effect on indigenous societies. Customary indigenous systems of 
organization and territoriality sometimes "blurred" as communities were fractured and 
reorganized to accommodate such disasters. The contemporary socio-spatial identities at 
work within (and beyond) the BC treaty process are not easily defined spaces but rather are, 
to use Lefebvrevian (1991) terminology, flexibly enacted representational spaces that 
simultaneously reproduce hegemonic order and function as an instrument of resistance. As 
shown in the "Lheidli T'enneh Area" example (Map 3), the flexibility of such socio-spatial 
identities is particularly evident where indigenous groups exhibit different expressions of 
territory in different contexts. One key source of tension among such boundary-meanings is 
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between what I have called "aboriginal title communities" and "residential communities," 
where each may invoke different allegiances, legitimating discourses and representations of 
space. The territories of contemporary "residential communities" are contrasted with those 
of "aboriginal title communities" not because one is more authentic than the other, but 
simply because they differ fundamentally in the "something else" that boundaries define. It 
is not just physical boundaries that overlap - it is the criteria used to define their meanings 
and bounds. Overlapping claims can be understood as a product of these kinds of varied 
boundary-meanings, conceptions that are in some contexts congruent, and in others, 
incompatible. 
Implications of overlapping and contested claims 
The examples presented in Chapter 4 demonstrate that modern treaties in British 
Columbia have (or would) confer to their indigenous signatories both exclusive and non­
exclusive rights and benefits in contested areas. Conferral of exclusive rights is prejudicial to 
the rights of groups with overlapping claims simply by virtue of the fact that once land is 
conferred exclusively to one group it is no longer available to another as part of future treaty 
settlement. Treaty bestowal of so-called non-exclusive rights and benefits may also have 
profound implications for indigenous groups with overlapping claims, particularly where two 
(or more) groups have different visions and objectives for a contested area. Conveyance of 
treaty rights in contested areas at best limits treaty settlement options available to indigenous 
groups who come later to their treaty, and at worst may significantly prejudice the rights of 
groups with overlapping claims. 
The underlying contention of the plaintiffs in the "overlap cases" is that modem 
treaties are conferring treaty rights in areas for which groups settling treaties do not have 
legitimate exclusive claim. In these cases the BC Supreme Court has not addressed the 
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underlying cause of these actions, but instead appears to have been persuaded by the 
argument that the issue can and should be addressed through political processes and, short of 
this, through litigation based on the supposed "complete answer" of the non-derogation 
clauses. It is the conclusion of this thesis that the court has done so without sufficient regard 
to the doctrine of aboriginal rights by: 1) diluting the duty of the Crown to meaningfully 
consult with indigenous groups where its action might impact the rights of groups with 
overlapping claims; 2) downplaying the extent to which treaty bestowal of so-called non­
exclusive rights may impact the rights of groups with overlapping claims; and 3) placing an 
ethically (if not legally) inappropriate burden on indigenous groups with overlapping claims 
to prove their rights in court. 
Simply including non-derogation language in modern treaties does not in itself 
prevent impacts on the rights of groups with overlapping claims. Reliance on non-derogation 
clauses, like "after the fact" consultation, simply postpones the underlying issue and 
effectively shifts a purportedly political process to one that is litigious. The potential for 
injustice is compounded by the BC Supreme Court's apparent inability to address the 
underlying question at the root of all of the overlap cases: does the practice of settling and 
implementing treaties in contested areas prejudice the rights of groups with overlapping 
claims? While it may be an overstatement to suggest that the BC Supreme Court's intent in 
the overlap cases was to subjugate legal doctrine to Crown policy, that is the result: treaties 
are being settled without regard to strength of respective claims and insufficient concern for 
the long-term implications for indigenous groups that contest such treaties. 
The BC Supreme Court has in effect sanctioned the Crown's approach to the issue, 
which if nothing else undermines incentive for the Crown and its indigenous treaty partners 
to substantively address the issue. Given the Crown's reluctance or inability to proactively 
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engage, meaningful accommodation of groups with overlapping claims may indeed require 
amending the land rights conferred by treaties, some of which have been under negotiation 
for close to two decades. The prospect of complicating such negotiations provides a 
powerful disincentive for the Crown and its treaty partners to "open the Pandora's box" of 
overlapping claims, let alone to attempt to accommodate the rights and interests of groups 
who contest such treaties. When considered in light of the overlap cases, and these 
provoked by only four of potentially over a hundred modern treaties in British Columbia, the 
unfortunate and somewhat ironic reality is that the BC treaty process, with the help of the BC 
Supreme Court and the polices of the Crown, is fostering the very thing it was intended to 
avoid: continued jurisdictional ambiguity and the potential for a plethora of future litigation 
related to the question of who actually has rights to the land. 
Towards reconciliation 
It is frankly surprising to me that the issue of overlapping claims has received so little 
attention from the academy, especially considering the enormous financial and social 
investment in the BC treaty process and the extent to which the issue is a significant barrier 
to the ethical settlement of treaties (BCTC, 2010a, 2010b, 2009). The dearth of scholarship 
on the issue has potentially profound implications for the future of treaty negotiation in 
British Columbia, particularly inasmuch as the Crown, in its ignorance of indigenous legal 
systems, risks becoming complicit in settling treaties that defy indigenous laws concerning 
territoriality, and in doing so may undermine the ethical and perhaps legal legitimacy of the 
BC treaty process itself. 
Sterritt and others (1998) have given a serious consideration to the territorial 
dimensions of indigenous law in the context of contested claims in the "Nass Area." Such 
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scholarship that makes indigenous law "visible" across cultures has tremendous utility for 
furthering our understanding of indigenous territoriality and tenure, and for working through 
the issue of overlapping and contested claims (see for example Napoleon, 2009; Thom, 2005; 
Daly 2005; Overstall, 2005; Turner et al., 2005; Brown, 2002; Turner and Jones, 2000; 
Marsden, 2002, 2001; Sterritt et al., 1998). This said, scholarship alone is not sufficient to 
effect the reconciliation of overlapping and contested claims. Research compiled by Sterritt 
and others (1998) did not prevent the Nisga'a treaty from being passed into law, even though 
it presented compelling evidence that that bounds of the Nisga'a treaty encompass the 
ancestral territories of other indigenous groups (see Map 2). Without the Crown or the courts 
providing some incentive, there was nothing to compel the Nisga'a to reconcile territorial 
claims with their indigenous neighbours. Such an approach to treaty-making may be seen as 
potentially coercive, where groups that progress more quickly through claims negotiation 
may be rewarded with the "spoils" from contested areas, and where groups whose progress in 
the treaty process is slower (or that opt not to participate in the treaty process at all) may find 
their territory compromised. 
A significant number of bilateral agreements concerning overlapping territory have 
been reached between and among indigenous groups (BCTC, 2010b). Such agreements have 
ranged from an acknowledgement that there is no overlapping territory between two groups, 
to contract agreements concerning boundary definition, access to resources and common 
development activities (BCTC, 2010b; see also for example Tseshaht First Nation, 2007; 
Wesley, 2007; Krehbiel, 2004). In some instances such agreements have resulted in 
"statement of intent" boundaries being redrawn (BCTC, 2010b). As indicated by the 
Tseshaht First Nation (2007) case, not all these bilateral agreements have proven durable 
(BCTC, 2010b). In the event that bilateral overlap agreements are included in the language 
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of treaties, they would likely contain constitutionally entrenched provisions concerning the 
sharing of territory. Where they do not become part of treaties, as with all modern treaties 
settled in British Columbia to date, a hierarchy of agreements is potentially created from 
which conflict can result (Devlin and Thielmann, 2009). 
While it is perhaps too early to know with any certainty the long-term efficacy of 
bilateral overlap agreements, is seems reasonable to conclude that should the terms of 
bilateral overlap agreements conflict with the terms of treaties (as was argued in Tseshaht 
First Nation, 2007), courts will likely give greater weight to treaties. Clarifying the 
relationship between treaties and bilateral overlap agreements is a key element of working 
through the issue of contested territorial claims. Indigenous groups entering into bilateral 
agreements concerning overlapping claims are likely well served by the inclusion of such 
agreements within the terms of treaties, as was the case with the Council of Yukon Indians 
(1993), the Inuit ofNunavut (1993) and the Inuit of Labrador (2005). 
The "overlap cases" make it clear that not all indigenous groups will be able to reach 
bilateral agreements concerning overlapping claims, particularly inasmuch as court decisions 
and Crown policy have combined to provide a disincentive to do so. The result in the 
overlap cases is symptomatic of a judicial system that seldom goes beyond what is necessary 
to decide the question, and only the question, that is put to it. Certainly the court in these 
cases would have rendered a valuable service had it provided a more constructive remedy. 
In fairness, it should also be noted that in the overlap cases the court to a large extent was 
required to respond to the way the cases were plead, which required it to examine the issue 
through the "lens" of a legal test for interlocutory relief, including placing emphasis on 
potential for immediately irreparable harm and an outcome that favoured a balance of 
convenience. Such an outcome aptly demonstrates the rigidity of the conventional legal 
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system, and that an ethical solution is not likely to be found in litigation. The BC Supreme 
Court itself has suggested that if it is forced to deal with contested claims, indigenous groups 
"may well face court imposed settlements which are less likely to be acceptable to them than 
negotiated solutions" (Gitanyow First Nation v. Canada, 1998, at para 41). 
The BC treaty process was founded on the recommendations of the BC Claims Tasks 
Force (1991) which were formally adopted by Canada, British Columbia and indigenous 
groups that agreed to participate. Salient to this project is the recommendation specifying 
that "First Nations resolve issues related to overlapping claims among themselves" (BC 
Claims Task Force, 1991, p. 20). In some instances, this expectation has proven to be 
wishful thinking. If we accept that this expectation requires that indigenous groups be 
motivated and able to address contested claims among themselves, it follows that the Crown 
would provide some incentive to do so, or at least not tacitly discourage such efforts. The 
"agreement" for First Nations participating in the BC treaty process to resolve overlaps 
among themselves is only part of the story. The Crown's recent practice of settling treaties 
in contested areas discourages the reconciliation of territorial claims simply because it 
removes the necessity to do so. By settling treaties in contested areas, and through its legal 
obligation to consult with potentially impacted groups, the Crown is implicated in the issue 
by default or design. The issue is not a strictly indigenous polemic. 
While the ability of the Crown to act unilaterally on the issue may be somewhat 
limited by its agreement for First Nations to resolve contested claims among themselves, 
there are a number of strategies available, not least that the Crown could reinstate its policy 
of not settling treaties until contested claims are addressed. Under such a scenario, 
"addressing" (as opposed to "resolving") contested claims might mean requiring the parties 
to a dispute to agree on a binding process of reconciliation prior to treaty settlement. Putting 
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in place an incentive to address the issue would open up a range of possibilities for 
reconciliation. 
While thorough treatment is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is worth briefly 
touching on three possible strategies for the reconciliation of contested claims: 1) enhancing 
the role of the BC treaty commission; 2) empowering indigenous institutions; and 3) 
establishing a tribunal or other form of quasi-judicial process. My intent here is not to 
provide an exhaustive review, but to identify some areas of inquiry that warrant scholarly 
attention. 
Enhancing the authority of the BC treaty commission 
As was discussed in chapter 4, the BC treaty commission has virtually no authority 
concerning overlapping claims. The BC Claims Force Report (1991), the Treaty 
Commission Agreement (1992), and the Treaty Commission Act (1995) are largely silent on 
the issue, and only require the commission to encourage indigenous parties to come to 
agreements on overlapping claims, and to assist in obtaining dispute resolution services when 
requested. The Task Force Report (1991) foresaw that indigenous groups might require 
funding from the commission to carry out studies to assist in addressing contested claims. 
Commission reports released over the past several years indicate that the commission is not 
sufficiently funded to fulfill this modest role (BCTC, 2010a; 2010b; 2009). Proposals for 
enhancing the role of the commission generally fall into two categories: 1) increased funding 
for the commission to support research and non-binding mediation (BCTC, 2010b); and 2) 
amendment of the Treaty Commission Act (1995) to provide the commission with more 
authority concerning overlapping claims (Arvey, 2007). 
While increasing funding for the commission may support the reconciliation of 
contested claims in some instances, the commission's inability to adjudicate disputes may 
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limit the efficacy of such an approach, particularly where indigenous groups fundamentally 
disagree on the scope of territorial rights and/or appropriate forms of political organization. 
The proposal for enhanced statutory authority raises another set of issues. It may be possible 
for the commission to build the capacity to answer the kinds of legal and political questions 
at the root of contested claims, provided it had sufficient resources. Such an approach, 
however, would in effect shift the role of the commission from facilitation to adjudication 
and possibly even enforcement. Given its current role as an advocate of the BC treaty 
process, the commission may not be seen by some groups (particularly those not participating 
in the BC treaty process) as being sufficiently impartial to perform such a role. 
Several questions worthy of scholarly attention arise from this line of reasoning: in 
what way would the commission need to build its capacity to play a more authoritative role 
in the resolution of contested claims; would the commission be seen as a legitimate arbiter of 
contested claims given the degree to which it is vested in the BC treaty process; and finally, 
would enhancing the authority of the commission be preferable to establishing some sort of 
new institutional mechanism independent of the commission? 
Indigenous institutions 
A discussion paper prepared by the First Nations Leadership Council27 summarised 
an indigenous perspective on the issue of overlapping claims as follows: 
The predominant understanding from a non-Aboriginal perspective, of the shared 
territories/overlap issue, is that it is a "map drawing" exercise ... to identity a definitive 
boundary between where the territory of one Nation ends and that of the other begins. This is 
27 The First Nations Leadership Council is comprised of political executives of the First Nations Summit, the 
Union of BC Indian Chiefs, and the British Columbia Assembly of First Nations. The mandate of the Council is to 
"represent the interests of First Nations in British Columbia and develop strategies and actions to bring about 
significant and substantive changes to government policy that will benefit all First Nations in British Columbia" (First 
Nations Leadership Council, 2006, p. 2). 
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problematic and reflects a common law and Eurocentric concept of what the issue is and what 
it means to resolve it. First Nations did not historically manage complex interrelations 
through clarification and adoption of borders. Rather, a range of mechanisms were employed 
which ordered how members of Nations would interact with each other in certain areas, and 
the types of activities that were permissible. When the issue is viewed from an Aboriginal 
perspective, the range of options and opportunities for resolution greatly expands" (First 
Nations Leadership Council, 2008, p. 2-3). 
In general terms, such an approach envisages some form of council of indigenous 
elders that would hear the details of contested claims, articulate relevant indigenous laws, 
and help guide the indigenous parties to the dispute towards a bilateral overlap agreement. 
Two proposals for establishing indigenous institutions have been suggested. An Indigenous 
Legal Lodge was proposed to address overlap issues arising from the Lheidli T'enneh treaty 
(Napoleon, 2007). The proposed Lodge would be comprised of a three-member panel from 
neutral indigenous groups, a legal expert in Canadian law, facilitators, and representatives of 
the indigenous groups involved. The approach would be for groups involved to share 
knowledge of the overlap area, how the relationship between and among indigenous groups 
was historically managed, and how indigenous law might inform a resolution to the dispute 
(Napoleon, 2007). Perhaps because of the delay of the Lheidli T'enneh treaty, the proposed 
Lodge was not funded, although it is apparently still being considered by the federal 
government (BCTC, 2010b). 
Another proposal for an indigenous institution was made in the context of British 
Columbia's intended (and now apparently defunct) Recognition and Reconciliation Act, 
which would have established a province-wide Indigenous Nations Commission to "facilitate 
the identification, formation or reconstitution of the political structures of indigenous nations" 
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and work with indigenous groups to "resolve issues of overlaps and shared territories" (First 
Nations Leadership Council and BC, 2009, p. 3). The intent was for the Indigenous Nations 
Commission to engage with the issues of whether the current organization of indigenous 
groups is consistent with the notion of a "proper rights holder" and to address related 
instances where the membership of one group overlaps with another (First Nations 
Leadership Council and BC, 2009). For at least some indigenous groups, the political 
implications of such an approach were likely part of the reason for their resistance to the 
proposed legislation (Thom, 2010; BCTC, 2010b). 
With the indefinite postponement of the legislation, the proposal for an Indigenous 
Nations Commission has gone no further to date. If such an approach were to be pursued, 
questions worthy of scholarly consideration would relate to the political and financial 
implications of reorganizing the political structures of indigenous groups: what criteria would 
be used to define the membership and territory of "indigenous nations;" would such a 
reorganization include groups that have already settled treaties; how would such a 
reorganization impact ongoing treaty negotiations; and, if such a reorganization were to 
involve the aggregation of smaller groups currently participating in the BC treaty process, 
which groups (if any) would be responsible for repaying the close to half-billion dollars in 
treaty support funding already loaned to indigenous groups participating in the BC treaty 
process? 
A quasi-judicial institution 
Though not detailed, there have also been proposals for a quasi-judicial tribunal 
intended to address overlapping and contested claims, perhaps in addition to other treaty-
related issues (BCTC, 2010b; First Nations Leadership Council, 2008; Sterritt, 1998). A 
quasi-judicial approach would be predicated in part on the notion that there will continue to 
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be instances where indigenous groups fundamentally disagree on the scope of territorial 
rights, and that such intractable disputes may ultimately require binding arbitration. A 
tribunal would be distinguished from other processes in that it would likely have powers 
similar to a superior court and be able to make determinations and law and fact that could be 
binding on the parties. The advantage of a tribunal, as opposed to conventional courts, is that 
be that it would be comprised of justices with specialized expertise on the issue, would likely 
not be bound by conventional judicial rules, and might employ a flexible process of 
information gathering, mediation and, as a last resort, adjudication. 
Under such a scenario, indigenous groups would be invited or required to refer 
contested claims to a tribunal prior to treaties being settled in contested areas. Provided that 
the tribunal were seen as impartial and legitimate, it may even be possible for indigenous 
parties to a dispute to agree prior to treaty settlement for their dispute to be addressed within 
a tribunal process after treaty settlement. While Canada has little experience with quasi-
judicial institutions in the context of indigenous issues,28 such strategies have been applied to 
the issue of overlapping claims in other jurisdictions, such as in Australia and New Zealand 
(see for example French, 2009; Dawson, 2004; Davies, 2003; Jones, 2002). 
The long-term efficacy of any process designed to effect the reconciliation of 
contested claims will likely depend on its ability to find solutions at the nexus of common 
law, indigenous laws, and political realities. Canadian common law is capable of evolving to 
recognize "new" and more sophisticated understandings of indigenous territoriality than have 
been articulated by the courts to date. Relative to other options, a quasi-judicial institution 
28 An exception is the new Canadian Specific Claims Tribunal, which is an adjudicative body created to decide 
specific claims related to Indian Reserves and settled treaties only. The Specific Claims Tribunal has all the powers 
of a superior court of record to determine questions of law or fact, and may receive and accept any evidence it sees fit. 
The Specific Claims Tribunal accepted its first claim on June 7,2011 (Canada, 201 lb). 
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would likely have a greater degree of perceived political and legal legitimacy, and thus may 
be better suited to inform the evolution of common law aboriginal rights. 
The critical evaluation of options concerning contested claims would be well served 
by scholarly inquiry into questions concerning the efficacy of quasi-judicial institutions in 
indigenous contexts: what principles and processes have been applied to effect the resolution 
of contested claims in New Zealand and Australia; which approaches and policies have 
worked and not worked, for whom and why; and finally, what are the merits and limitations 
of quasi-judicial institutions in the contest of contested claims, and would the kinds of 
tribunals employed in New Zealand and Australia have utility for addressing contested 
claims in British Columbia? 
Concluding comments 
The Crown has sought to frame treaty negotiation in British Columbia as a "forward-
looking" process, rather than one that also engages in detail with the legal geographies of 
indigenous groups and the difficult stories of colonization (Egan, 2008; Penikett, 2006; 
Woolford, 2005). The issue of contested territorial claims is symptomatic of a treaty process 
that pays little attention to the particulars of indigenous law and history. This is not to say 
that common and indigenous laws hold all of the answers to the issue of contested claims. 
Beyond practical limitations are broader issues related to extant configurations of indigenous 
political power and agency, and the extent to which the application of legal principle might 
challenge such arrangements. The conception of a "proper rights holder" is particularly 
challenging in that its application - perhaps actualized through the aggregation of smaller 
indigenous groups (for example Indian Act-defined Bands) into broader indigenous 
collectives (for example "Nations") - may require smaller groups to give up some local 
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political autonomy (Thom, 2010). 
This said, the application of legal principle - perhaps employed through some sort of 
quasi-judicial process - is likely preferable to the alternative: a continuation of a potentially 
coercive approach to treaty-making that may privilege some indigenous groups to the 
detriment of others, continued uncertainty with respect to the durability of bilateral overlap 
agreements, and a continuation of indigenous groups fighting among themselves and in 
conventional courts for recognition of territorial jurisdiction and rights. What is required is 
focused research on alternatives, and particularly on how the nexus of common and 
indigenous laws might inform the resolution of contested territorial claims in the context of 
treaty negotiation in British Columbia. 
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Map 1: "Traditional Territories" of First Nations participating in the BC treaty process. Boundaries shown represent the approximate boundaries of traditional territories described in First Nation Statements of Intent (SOI) submitted to and 
received by the BC treaty commission (BC ILMB, 2010). Publication of SOI boundaries does not imply that the First Nations, the Province of British Columbia, or the Government of Canada have agreed to the boundaries shown. 
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Map 2: Overlapping claims in the "Nass Area." Boundaries of the Tsimshian, Gitanyow and Gitksan First Nations are the traditional territories described in First Nation Statements of Intent (SOI) submitted to and received by the BC treaty commission (BCILMB, 
2010). Publication of SOI boundaries does not impiy that the First Nations, the Province of British Columbia, or the Government of Canada have agreed to the boundaries shown. Boundaries related to the Nisga'a treaty are from the appendices to the Nisga'a Final 
Agreement (NFA, 1999). The "Nass Area" refers to "the entire Nass watershed" (NFA, 1999, p. 9). 
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Map 3: Overlapping claims in the "Lheidli T'enneh Area." Boundaries of First Nations participating in the BC treaty process, including the "Lheidli T'enneh Area," are the traditional territories described in First Nation Statements of Intent (SOI) submitted to 
and received by the BC treaty commission (BC ILMB, 2010). Publication of SOI boundaries does not imply that the First Nations, the Province of British Columbia, or the Government of Canada have agreed to the boundaries shown. The Treaty 8 boundary is 
based on the federal interpretation of the Treaty 8 boundary. Other boundaries are from publically available agreements between indigenous groups and the provincial government, such as Forest and Range Agreements and Strategic Engagement Agreements. 
